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ABSTRACT 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about multidimensional problems to 
the former republics of the USSR and their inhabitants.  In 1990s Ukraine, Crimea 
became a center of conflict between Ukraine and Russia over the former Soviet Black 
Sea Fleet and Crimea itself, perceived as historically their own by both sides of the 
conflict. Local Crimean authorities took advantage of the specificity of a demographic 
situation in Crimea where Ukrainians, the titular nation, are in the minority and 
considerably Russified to claim for autonomy. Later, they attempted to secede from 
Ukraine. At the same time, the Crimean Tatar influx from exile, orchestrated by the 
Stalin regime in 1944, further exacerbated the ‘triangle of conflict’ between the dyads 
Russia-Ukraine and Crimea-Ukraine. The Crimean Tatars, currently 12 percent of the 
Crimean population, proclaimed Crimea the national territory of the Crimean Tatar 
people, on which they alone possess the right to self government and claimed greater 
rights for themselves as allegedly the most indigenous people in Crimea, while the rest 
are colonizers. 
This thesis explains the historical developments in Crimea and attempts to draw 
implications to the Ukrainian government in dealing with Crimean Tatar nationalism 
which seems to be overcoming the problems within the ‘triangle of conflict,’ that was so 
sharp in the 1990s. 
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Since the demise of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 and the emergence of the 
newly independent states (NIS), Russia has employed various techniques to preserve its 
dominance over them.  It is very important for Russia to keep Ukraine under its influence 
because of Ukraine’s exceptional strategic location.  In the words of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Russia, with a subordinated Ukraine, becomes an empire, and without it, 
ceases to be one.1   
Russia and Ukraine are of equal importance to each other.2  First, Ukraine and 
Russia are economically interdependent.  The biggest disparity lays in Ukraine’s vast 
dependence on Russian energy sources.  However, Ukraine transports the majority of 
Russian oil and natural gas to Europe, making Russia almost equally dependant on 
Ukraine in commercial terms.  Both countries are major trading partners.  Second, 
Ukraine serves as a buffer separating Russia from an expanded NATO.  This is true both 
on an emotional level and a physical one.  Having its former adversary (NATO) present 
in a neighboring republic is a threat to the psyche as much as it is to national security.  On 
a personal level, both Russians and Ukrainians have relatives on the opposite side of the 
border. 
Russia has tried to exercise pressure upon Ukraine from the very beginning of its 
independence.  The majority of disputes between the two states have been settled.  The 
Crimea and the issues of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) based there still remain an 
important outstanding issue in diplomatic relations between the states.3   
                                                 
1 Cited in Paul J. D’Anieri et al., Politics and Society in Ukraine (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1999), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 John (Ivan) Jaworsky, “Crimea’s Importance to Ukraine and Its Future Security,” in Crimea: 
Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects, ed. Maria Drohobycky (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1995), 135. 
 2
Besides the issues of the RBSF in Ukrainian territory, the so-called ‘triangle of 
conflict’4 — Russia-Crimea-Ukraine — brings certain difficulties to Ukraine’s state-
building efforts.  It is the Crimean Tatars who brought another dimension to the current 
instability in Crimea. This thesis will examine the influence of both the Crimean Tatar 
influx to Ukrainian Crimea from exile and the RBSF, primarily based in Ukraine, on the 
‘triangle of conflict’ and each other.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
A stable, predictable, and democratic Ukraine is of vital importance for the West 
and particularly to the stability and security in the EU.  It is a “key-stone in the arch of 
security in Central Europe” because instability within a state with such territory and 
strategic location could easily trigger the same in the young democracies of Central 
Europe.5  Current relations between Ukraine and Russia are not good.  During almost 
every disagreement between the two countries, the issues of Crimea and the RBSF 
resurface.  According to Jaworski, both security analysts and international news media 
have highlighted Crimea as “a flash point of tensions between Ukraine and Russia.”6  
Once thought to be a “settled issue,” Ukraine and Russia are far from a lasting resolution 
to the controversies over the basing of RBSF in the Crimean peninsula and other issues in 
the Black Sea region.   
The status and fate of the Crimean Tatars has added a further layer of instability 
to an already troublesome region.  Historically, the Tatars are the most numerous 
“indigenous” population in modern Crimea.7  Historians consider them to be the 
descendants of the Mongols, who occupied most of contemporary Russia and Ukraine in 
the thirteenth century.  By the fifteenth century the Crimean Tatars had become a 
separately distinguished national group, forming the Crimean Khanate, and occupying the 
                                                 
4 The term ‘triangle of conflict’ is used in several works of Taras Kuzio to explain contemporary 
interrelations in triangle Russia-Crimea-Ukraine.  
5 D’Anieri et al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 1. 
6 Jaworsky. “Crimea’s Importance to Ukraine,” 135. 
7 Justin Burke, Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention (New York, NY: the Open 
Society Institute, 1996), 17. 
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territory of Crimean peninsula itself and Black Sea coastal areas.  The Khanate reached 
its climax under the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century.  By the eighteenth 
century, modernized Russia fought the Crimean Tatar Khanate along with the declining 
Turkish Empire.  In 1783, Crimea was annexed by Russia.  The newly conquered 
territories became Russified.   
Despite Russia’s moderate tolerance toward the Tatars’ religious traditions, they 
emigrated in large numbers to nearby Turkey.  In 1783, “Tatars comprised about 83 
percent of the peninsula population…by 1897, their share had plummeted to 34 percent, 
while Russians and Ukrainians comprised almost 45 percent.”8  The late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century marked the reemergence of the Tatar intelligentsia.  After the 
Communist revolution of 1917 Crimean Tatars were under the constant purge of 
repressive policy.  In 1941, when the Germans took over Crimea, most Tatars openly 
supported them up until the time the Germans started to repress them.  Soviet troops 
retook Crimea in 1944 and Stalin decided to deport the Crimean Tatars to ‘special 
settlements’ in Central Asia and Siberia, in retaliation for their collaboration with 
Germany (a fate shared by many Chechens as well).  After the death of Stalin, the 
majority of deported nationalities were rehabilitated by Khrushchev, but Crimean Tatars 
were among the exceptions.  1989 was thus a turning point in the life of Crimean Tatars, 
because they were granted the right to return to Crimea.   
The influx of Crimean Tatars to the peninsula created many problems of social, 
political, and economic character, which became hard issues to be resolved for the 
Ukrainian authorities.  Consequently, these problems generated unrest among the Tatars 
which was directed against the Slavs.  This thesis hypothesizes that the presence of the 
RBSF in Ukraine can not be a stabilizing factor against the desire of Crimean Tatars to 
make Crimea autonomous within Ukraine and subsequently pursue full independence. 
                                                 
8 Burke, Crimean Tatars, 21. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Survey of Prior Work on the Question 
The Crimean question is of paramount importance for the internal stability of 
Ukraine.9  Many scholars compare the potential for ethnic conflict in Crimea with the one   
in former Yugoslavia.10  Relations between Ukraine and Russia are characterized by 
considerable ambiguity.  Scholarly disputes, relevant to this thesis, have been focused on 
two areas.  First, a number of academics see the presence of the RBSF in Crimea as a 
destabilizing factor for Ukraine.  Mark Galeotti writes that “the presence of the Black Sea 
Fleet [Russian]…created a further complication [for internal ethno-cultural divisions and 
for the weakness of the Ukrainian state].”11  John Jaworski considers the RBSF in Crimea 
as mostly a destabilizing factor for Ukraine.12  Primarily, he refers to an example of 
Moldova’s Trans-Dniestria region where the Russian troops that are stationed there 
intervened into a conflict supporting the Russian population in Moldova against the 
Moldovan nationalists.  Additionally, a number of personnel of the Black Sea Fleet13 
have been allowed to stand as candidates for office in both the Crimean Supreme Council 
and the Sevastopol City Council, where they formed a military lobby.  It appears absurd 
that Russian citizens were allowed to participate in governing the Ukrainian 
administrative body.  Furthermore, the existence of the RBSF military bases in Crimea 
allows Russia to influence developments in the Black Sea region.  If tensions between 
Russia and Ukraine escalate, it is more convenient for Russia, in order to control 
                                                 
9 Jaworsky, “Crimea’s Importance to Ukraine,” 135-156. 
10 James Sherr, “After Yugoslavia: Whither Ukraine?” in Between Russia and the West: Foreign and 
Security Policy of Independent Ukraine, ed. Kurt R. Spillmann (Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 
Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1999), 142; Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 69-70.  
11 Mark Galeotti, “The Challenge of ‘soft security’: crime, corruption, and chaos,” in New Security 
Challenges in Post Communist Europe, ed. Andrew Cottey, et al. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University 
Press, 2002), 164-165. 
12 Jaworsky, “Crimea’s Importance to Ukraine,” 137-139. 
13 This instance has been drawn from the times of 1994, when the Black Sea Fleet has not been 
divided yet.  Today, the similar situation is impossible.  The citizens of Ukraine only can participate in 
Ukrainian elections. 
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maritime trade, to project force into Crimea and the entire Ukrainian Black Sea shore 
from Crimea than from significantly more distant Novorossiysk.14   
Trade, especially oil and natural gas, is crucial for Ukraine to diversify its sources 
of energy, reducing the Russian influence over the Ukrainian economy.  Taras Kuzio 
stresses the destabilizing effect of the Russian military presence in Crimea.15  He points 
out that the size of the Russian military in Crimea is sufficient to fuel a conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine.  However, he insists that Russia is neither in the right condition to 
begin a full-scale military conflict nor has the intention to do so.  Roman Solchanyk 
considers the continued Russian military presence in Ukrainian territory as the sign of 
Moscow’s military and geostrategic interest to the region.  The bilateral agreements on 
the issues of the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), signed in 1997, did not 
resolve the disputes, but rather postponed them until 2017, when the formal rights for the 
RBSF basing in Ukraine will expire.16  Sherman Garnett believes that as long as the 
issues pertaining to the RBSF on Ukrainian territory remain important, its personnel and 
respective military units will represent a possible source of conflict in Crimea.17  
Moreover, he named current ethnic, social, and economic tensions in Crimea exacerbated 
by the declining RBSF as the “combustive mixture.”18  Igor Zevelev noted that as of 
2001 the issue of ownership of the warm water port of Sevastopol was still contested and 
that “the presence of the Black Sea Fleet [Russian] added a military dimension to the 
controversy.”19  Victor Kremenyuk stresses that the vast disagreements over the issues of 
the Black Sea Fleet have been managed peacefully with the employment of diplomatic 
                                                 
14 Victor Myasnikov, “Chernomorslii Flot Gotovyat k Evacuatsii: Novuyu Bazu Speshno Stroyat v 
Novorossiiske za 2 Milliarda Dollarov,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 10, 2006. Available at 
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2006-03-10/1_flot.html# (accessed October 10, 2007). According to Russia’s 
plans, Novorossiysk will become the main base for the RBSF by 2016.  
15 Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy, 65-66, 148n38. 
16 Roman Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia: the Post-Soviet Transition (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 138. 
17 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 73. 
18 Ibid., 82. 
19 Igor Zevelev, “Redefinition of Nation, Security, and Stability,” in Russia in the New Century: 
Stability and Disorder, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Brelauer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
press, 2001), 279. 
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means, preventing the emergence of a serious conflict.20 However, the disputes are still 
far from resolved.21  Garnett points out that the postponement of the final decision on the 
RBSF basing issues in Ukraine until “at least” 2017 remains the “source of external 
instability on the peninsula [Crimean].”22    
The second academic debate addresses the obviously contentious question: does 
the presence of RBSF on the Ukrainian territory have a stabilizing effect on the situation 
in Crimea?  The Russian military claims the RBSF in Crimea is a stabilizing factor.23  
According to this view, the RBSF defends the southern flanks of Russia and Ukraine 
against rising threats from Turkey, the long-term rival of Russia, expelled from Crimea in 
1783.  Anatol Lieven does not take a position regarding the issue of the stabilizing effect 
of the RBSF in Ukraine; he views the RBSF as neutral in its effect on the stability of 
Crimea.24  Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, in a discussion about the 
“Problems and Prospects for Ukraine in the Twenty-First Century,” do not mention the 
RBSF, stationed in Ukraine, as a potential source of conflict.25   
2. Major Questions and Debate 
Both schools agree that the RBSF, based in Ukraine, affects Ukrainian political, 
social, and economic life.  It also affects Russian-Ukrainian relations.  The schools 
identify a handful of positive and negative effects of the RBSF presence in the Ukrainian 
territory.  However, an impact of the Russian troops stationed in Ukraine on the behavior 
of the Crimean Tatars has not yet been studied.  The Crimean Tatars strongly supported 
Ukrainian authorities in the struggle against the movement that wanted Crimea to secede 
                                                 
20 Victor A. Kremenyuk, Conflicts in and Around Russia: Nation-Building in Difficult Times 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 118. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Sherman W. Garnett, “Incomplete Settlement,” in Russia and the West: the 21st Century Security 
Environment, ed. Alexey Arbatov, et al. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 141. 
23 Jaworsky, “Crimea’s Importance to Ukraine,” 135. 
24 Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: a Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1999), 130. 
25 D’Anieri et al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 262-273. 
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from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation.26  At the same time, they publicly 
expressed their willingness to demand a broad autonomy within Ukraine with possible 
further steps to full independence.27  Ukraine’s experience with the pro-Russian 
separatism of the 1990s in Crimea demonstrated the difficulties in dealing with 
separatism.  However, pro-Russian separatism was peaceful.28  In contrast to the sixty-
seven percent share of Russians in the Crimean population, the Crimean Tatars, twelve 
percent of the population, often use violence in pursuit of their political and economic 
goals; they are supported by other Muslim states, and sometime in the 1990s the 
Chechens began conducting actions in Crimea.29  Will Ukrainian authorities be able to 
control the situation in Crimea in case of a large scale Crimean Tatars uprising?  Does the 
RBSF play the role of a deterrent against the Tatars?  What are the ways to prevent ethnic 
separatism in Crimea and to make constitutional the temporary character of the RBSF in 
the Ukrainian territory?  What will the consequences be for Ukraine in case of granting 
the Crimean Tatars a status of ‘indigenous people’ in Crimea? 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a work of contemporary history, which seeks to explain the 
emergence of current conditions in light of earlier events, and to appraise the range of 
likely future developments that past experience has made possible.   
The bulk of the sources for this thesis will be secondary sources (books, news 
media and other internet resources and journals).  This thesis is also going to use some 
primary sources – interviews with and statements of officials.  As the other primary 
source, this thesis will use some published official documents from Czarist and Soviet 
                                                 
26 Oxana Shevel, “Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state: the challenge of politics, the use of law, 
and the meaning of rhetoric,” (paper presented at the Association for the Study of the Nationalities (ASN) 
Fifth Annual World Convention, Columbia University, New York, NY, April 13-15, 2000, 
http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/oshevel.html (accessed October 10, 2007). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Toll Bukkvoll, “Ukraine and the Black Sea Region,” in Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of 
Cooperation and Conflict, ed. Tunc Aybak (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2001), 104-106.  
29 Idil P. Izmirli, “Regionalism and the Crimean Tatar Political Factor in 2004 Ukrainian Presidential 
Elections,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly (February 28, 2007), 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=171 (accessed October 10, 2007). 
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sources, as well as governmental documents of the Post-Soviet era, available on the web. 
The author has established some contacts with the Ukrainian navy officers in Sevastopol 
to use as additional sources of information on the issue.   
E. THESIS SYNOPSIS 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter I will cover the purpose of the 
thesis, its significance, literature review, methodology, and the thesis synopsis.  Chapter 
II will provide a brief history of Crimea to reveal possible grounds for ethics of interstate 
conflicts.  Chapter II will study the Crimea’s importance for Ukraine and its future 
security.  Chapter IV will look at the emergence and the evolution of the Crimean Tatars 
in Crimea, and influence of other nations on their development as a nation.  Chapter V 
will look at the RBSF issues in Crimea, and its military, political, and economic influence 
in the region.  Chapter VI will study the current ethnic imbroglio in the Crimea, and the 
role of historical myths in shaping ethnic groups’ behavior, and problems and prospective 
related to this.  Chapter VII will summarize findings and produce conclusions and policy 
recommendations to deal with possible Crimean Tatar separatism in Crimea.  
 9
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMEA  
The geography of Crimea determined its history.  Gwendolyn Sasse pointed this 
out as “an important factor in the capacity for autonomy or secession.”30  Study of 
Crimean history provides an important basis for evaluation of a potential for ethnic 
conflict.  During the development of a state over time it goes through different historical 
experiences, shaping its development.  Historically, “the Black Sea and its coastal areas 
have played an important role in the history of Eastern Europe and Western Asia.”31  
Since territories of contemporary Crimea and southern Ukraine were colonized for the 
first time by ancient Greeks, they became an important economic zone; later, the 
founders of Kievan Rus, the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, Lithuanians, Polish, Russians, 
and, finally, the Soviets tried to establish control over these territories to serve for their 
political, economical, and military purposes throughout various periods of history.32   
Currently, Crimea (in Ukrainian Avtonomna Respublika Krym) is an autonomous 
republic of Ukraine located in southern Ukraine.33  It occupies a peninsula of the same 
name (Crimea) on the northern coast of the Black Sea.  The total area of the republic is 
26,100 sq. km. (10,008 sq. mi.).34  The capital of Crimea is the city of Simferopol, where 
all branches of the republic’s power are placed.  The city of Sevastopol, a home for the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian Navy, is located within the Crimean peninsula, 
                                                 
30 Gwendolyn Sasse, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2007), 4. 
31 Alan W. Fisher, Introduction to the Russian annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge [Eng] University Press, 1970), xi. 
32 See for details Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: a History, 2nd edition, (Toronto; Buffalo: Published by the 
University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994). 
33 Constitution of Ukraine, Ch. X, art. 134-139, http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm#r10 
(accessed May 29, 2007).  
34 “Encyclopedia: Common Information,” Information Portal Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 
Available at http://www.crimea-portal.gov.ua/index.php?v=7&tek=&par=&art=70&date (accessed 
December 29, 2007). 
 10
but it has special status, allowing its administration to be subordinated directly to nation-
level government in Kyiv rather than the one of Crimea in Simferopol.35   
A. CRIMEA AND CONTIGUOUS AREAS IN EARLY HISTORY 
The origin of the name Crimea came from the one of the Crimean province capital 
in the Golden Horde times.  Governors of Crimea, appointed by the Tatar khans at Sarai 
on the Idil36 (Volga), the capital of the Golden Horde, resided at Solhat, or Eski Kirim 
(“Old Crimea”) for over a hundred years up until the mid-fifteenth century.37   
1. Prehistoric Times 
Major prehistoric sites were found in the territory of contemporary Ukrainian 
steppes and Crimea as early as roughly 5000 to 4000 BC during the times of the 
Trypillian culture.38  Later, in about 3000 BC, the nomads, who had a distinctive way of 
life famous for the domestication of animals, emerged in Ukrainian steppes moving 
southwards from overpopulated areas.39   
The earliest inhabitants, who were mentioned in literary references, were “the 
Cimmerians.  Homer, in the Odyssey, mentioned them as the ones who populated the 
northern shore of the Black Sea.”40  Besides the Odyssey, very little information is 
available on the Cimmerians.  Scholars’ views are divided on their origins.  Some 
consider them as the ones who migrated to the territories of contemporary Ukraine, and 
others see them as native there.41  
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Crimean Tatars (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 3. 
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The Scythians expelled the Cimmerians in the seventh century BC.  Two hundred 
years later, Herodotus, “the Greek father of history,” described them as Indo-Europeans, 
Iranian-speaking nomads of several types.42  The Scythians of the first type, plowers 
(those who lived by the agriculture and used ploughs), were an agricultural indigenous 
people, who accepted the name of their overlords.  Some scholars consider them to be the 
ancestors of the Slavs.43  The second type, the nomadic Royal Scythians, corresponded to 
those who forced other Scythians and non-Scythians to pay them tribute by fierce 
military force.  The Scythians went through victories and defeats, and ended up 
“overwhelmed and assimilated” by the Sarmatians; only “a remnant of whom managed to 
find refuge in the Crimea.”44  The Sarmatians dominated the steppes of contemporary 
Ukraine for four hundred years up until the second century AD and Sarmatian control 
was destroyed by Khuns from the East. 
2. Crimea and Kievan Rus’ 
Both the sea and the steppe served as an avenue for newcomers.  Greeks 
established their colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea.  In Crimea, they set 
up important historic centers at Chersonesus (present-day a part of Sevastopol), 
Theodosia, and Panticapeum (the center of the so-called Bosphoran kingdom, present-day 
Kerch).  For the first time the Gothic invasion of 270 AD, and later the Khuns, destroyed 
the Greek colonies.  From that point forward “the Eurasian steppes would become for 
almost a millennium the domain of the Turkic peoples.”45 
Since the establishment of Kievan Rus’ in 852-859 AD, the dominance of the 
Turkic peoples over the northern shores of the Black Sea was constantly challenged.46  
Princes Oleh (882-912?) and Ihor (912-45) plundered the Khazars’ ports and cities on the 
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Caspian Sea; prince Sviatoslav (962-72), through a series of raids, crushed the Volga 
Bulgars, the mighty Khazars, “a people probably of Turkic origin”47 and “razed their 
capital at Itil on the Volga.”48  However, the control over the lands from Volga to 
Danube did not endure.  It was gone with Sviatoslav’s death.  In the late tenth century 
(988), prince Volodymyr the Great accepted Christianity, offered by the Byzantine, but 
later conquered “the Bytzantine-held Crimean city of Chersonesus” in demand for 
marriage with the Bytzantine co-emperor’s sister Anne.49  Again, during the rule of 
prince Iaroslav the Wise (1036-54) the authority of Kievan Rus’ was, once again, 
extended to the Black Sea.50   
In sum, despite the efforts of the Kievan Rus’ princes, their control over the 
Crimean peninsula was volatile.  Crimea was never under their control.  Control was only 
partial and sporadic. 
3. The Mongols, Golden Horde and Crimea 
The Mongols flourished under the rule of a gifted leader of the name Temjun.  He 
adopted a title of Jengis Khan — Khan of Khans.  He managed to unify divided and rival 
tribes, which later in 1240 managed to capture the Kievan Rus capital of Kiev.  Thus, the 
territories of former Kievan Rus were included to the Golden Horde, a khanate, 
established in the western part of the Mongol Empire, which included Crimea and the 
northern shores of the Black Sea.51 
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Even before the Mongols arrival in the area, it was largely populated by Turks, 
who absorbed Mongols and their language.52  This fact is proved by the Golden Horde’s 
coinage, which had Turkish script on them.53   
The Black Death, the deadly pandemic of the 1340s, was a major factor 
contributing to the Golden Horde’s downfall.54  A fatal blow to the Horde was dealt by 
Tamerlane, who annihilated Tokhtamysh's army, destroyed his capital, looted the 
Crimean trade centers, and deported the most skillful craftsmen to his own capital in 
Samarkand. In the 1440s, the Horde was again racked by civil war. This time it broke up 
into separate Khanates.  The Khanate of Crimea was one of them.  None of these new 
Khanates was stronger than Muscovite Russia, which finally broke free of Tatar control 
by 1480. 
B. THE KHANATE OF CRIMEA 
As the one of the many remnants of the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate, 
“more than any other preserved the traditions and institutions of the Golden Horde.”55  
Haci Giray, “a descendant of Cingis Khan [Jengis Khan],”56 assumed independent power 
sometime in between 1420 and 1441.57  He founded a dynasty which ruled the Crimean 
Khanate uninterruptedly until 1783, the date of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
Moreover, the newly established Crimean Khanate required outside support and 
assistance for its survival.  During his rule, Haci balanced friendship and alliance with 
Lithuania along with Poland, who recently extended its influence over former Kievan 
Rus’ territories of contemporary Ukraine and Muscovite Russia.58  It can be explained by 
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the fact that Haci Giray himself found refuge from the Golden Horde in Lithuania, and 
was born in Lithuania, and the Tatars of Crimea sent the request to Casimir, grand prince 
of Lithuania, to “give them Haci Giray as khan.”59  
The Crimean Khanate shared the Crimean peninsula with the Genoese, and tried 
to regain their ports and cities in the south and southwest of Crimea.60  In this effort they 
went into an alliance with the relatively new Ottoman Empire, which seized “the 
centuries-old Muslim and Turkic dream of…Constantinople, the capital of the East 
Roman Empire.”61  Since than the situation was forever changed for the Genoese, whose 
trade was dependant on straits now controlled by the Ottomans.  In 1454, the Tatars and 
the Turks made an unsuccessful attack on the port of Kefe; in 1475 they finally captured 
it from the Genoese, strengthening future Crimean-Ottoman political and military 
relations. 
Some sources suggest that from thirteenth through fifteenth centuries Crimea was 
the home for Kingdom Theodoro.  It was conquered by the Turks in 1475.  It is 
considered as a link between the Roman Empire and Slavic states.62  Sources available on 
Theodoro are scarce.  However, some existing works suggest that its population 
numbered around two hundred thousand just before its fall in 1475.63  
In 1460, Haci Giray died suddenly, most likely from poisoning.  His death 
initiated a period of intense competition for power and leadership over the Crimean 
Khanate.  Internal fighting was resolved by the establishment of the Ottomans’ political 
supremacy over the rival Crimean khans.64  The Ottomans occupied the vacated Genoese 
territories, establishing a special Ottoman province and, in 1478, the Tatars and the 
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Ottomans signed a treaty regulating the latter’s authority in Crimea.65   The treaty 
promulgated the khan’s authority over internal political and military issues, the Ottoman 
sultan was a sovereign in the Crimea and regulated the Crimean khanate foreign relations, 
and the khanate supported the Ottomans in their military campaigns.66   
Alan W. Fisher, in his book The Crimean Tatars, stressed that, contrary to “the 
claims of many Soviet historians” the Crimean Tatars were not “marionettes in Ottomans 
hands.”67  Throughout the history of the Crimean Khanate it made ad hoc alliances with 
Poland-Lithuania and Moscow in pursuit of political and economic goals: with Poland-
Lithuania to counter Muscovy and with Muscovy to fight Kazan.  The alliance with the 
Ottomans was more or less constant and, for substantial compensation, the Tatars 
participated in Ottoman military campaigns against its neighbors and more distant 
adversaries.68 
The Crimean Khanate was very mighty at the beginning of its existence.  
However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries khans started to lose their power 
due to domestic instability.  The leaders of local clans, the beys, possessed certain wealth, 
political and military power, and become less dependent on the khans, acting on their 
own without the khan’s consent.   
The Ottomans lost strength in Europe and, contrarily, Russia gained power.  
Russia had interest in gaining access to the Black Sea and, exploiting Crimean internal 
instability and weakness, it invaded and in 1774 forced khans under its influence; and 
later in 1783, Crimea was annexed by the Russian empire. 69 
C. CRIMEA UNDER RUSSIA’S RULE 
After the annexation, Catherine II made a governmental reorganization in Crimea.  
It was not the first experience for Russia to rule a Muslim region in the Russian empire: 
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the Kazan Tatars and Volga Bashkirs were annexed prior to the Crimea annexation.70  To 
fulfill her decision, Catherine organized a census in Crimea, a study of the Crimean tax 
administration system, and appointed the Crimean District Government (Krymskoe 
Zemskoe Pravitel’stvo) of newly established Tavricheskaya oblast’, “the area of the 
former Crimean Khanate from the Dnepr River to Taman [it stretched far beyond the 
Crimean peninsula itself and included a considerable piece of contemporary Ukraine’s 
territory].”71 
The old Khanate’s administrative system was replaced by the usual one that was 
within the Russian empire of those days.  The vertical administrative-territorial division 
was as follows: the oblast’ (region) was within the gubernia of Ekaterinislav and Tavrid 
and consisted of seven uezds (districts).  In terms of religion, Russian policy of the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was intended to eradicate Islam within the Russian 
empire.  Later on in 1773, Catherine, who was irreligious herself, issued her ‘Toleration 
of All Faiths’ decree, allowing the Tatars to practice Islam.72   
Catherine realized that the use of Russian administrators was not very productive 
in settling down issues in native regions.73  Thus she decided to stuff as much as possible 
into positions in uezds by natives.  Moreover, she permitted the local native elders to be 
in charge of daily routines in certain regions of Tavricheskaya oblast’.  Similarly to the 
Kazan Tatar mirzas (local nobility), she allowed Crimean mirzas to receive “Russian 
charters in pomestie lands,” “to own…peasants (non-Christian),” and “to hold ranks in 
the Russian army.”74 
Catherine allowed each Crimean “to enjoy the same duties and privileges as did 
his counterpart in Russia.”75  At the same time, she allowed for those who did not to want 
to have Russian citizenship to leave for the Ottoman Empire.  It was estimated that during 
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the first decade after annexation, the amount of Tatars that left the Crimea ranged 
approximately from 20,000-30,00076 to 150,000-200,00077 with the pre-annexation 
Crimean Tatar population of “a little less than a half-million.”78  The mass exodus of 
Tatars during the last decade of the Crimean Khanate (since 177279) and the first decade 
after annexation has left vast amounts of land vacant, which, besides the demographics, 
had some negative effects on the agriculture.   
On the other side, free land in the state’s disposal tempted the colonists.  By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, besides the 8,746 Russians80 who existed before, 
some “35,000 non-Muslims had been settled in the Crimean peninsula.…the former 
Crimean Khanate, which included lands from the Dnestr to the Kuban Rivers, there were 
just under 100,000 Russian settlers.”81 
The annexation of Crimea is an important event in Russian history.  “By annexing 
the Crimea Russia achieved what many considered to be her ‘natural’ southern 
frontiers.”82  Nineteenth-century Crimean nationalism had spread to other Muslim 
entities within the Russian Empire with increasingly anti-Russian feelings, caused by 
Russian disrespect for Tatar culture and forced Russification.   
However, suppression of the Tatar culture needs to be viewed through the 
comparative lenses with the Russian empire’s attitude toward the Ukrainian one.  For the 
Tatars, “the government encouraged cultural traditionalism…Turkish, Arabic, and Koran 
were taught” in schools and universities.83  Tatar intelligentsia published their books, 
journals and newspapers. In Ukraine, the use of the Ukrainian language was suppressed.  
For instance, “in…118-year period 3,214 titles [mostly belles-lettres] saw publication, on 
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the average twenty-seven titles per year for a population of approximately twenty 
million.”84  With periodicals the situation was much worse: “the first daily newspaper in 
the Ukrainian language was not founded until 1905… [It] survived until 1914.”85  On the 
contrary, the Tatars published twelve newspapers in 1914,86 which allows one to 
conclude that the Tatars were better off under Imperial Russia rule than other minorities.   
D. CRIMEA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1. Crimea After the 1917 Revolution and During the Civil War 
During the Russian revolutions of 1917-18 Tatar nationalists increasingly claimed 
their independence.87  The first World War caused a crisis in the identity of the Crimean 
Tatars.  On the one side, the Tatars were represented in the Duma (the legislature), within 
the Russian executive they participated in Muslim organizations and fought on the 
western front of World War I.  On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire supported 
Russia’s enemies in World War I and the idea about the war against it was hardly 
acceptable.   
“The Crimean Tatars were psychologically prepared to support any movement to 
eliminate the tsarist regime, and to remove from the Crimea Russian institutions 
representing centralized state control and authority.”88  In 1917, three main political 
groups were active in Crimea: the Tatar National Directory, the Crimean Provincial 
Assembly (the organization of Russian and Ukrainian liberals in Crimea), and the 
Bolshevics.  The former two were against the latter and formed a Crimean General 
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were supported in the garrisons in Sevastopol.  After the Russian revolution, the Tatar 
National Constituent Assembly (Kurultai) in Bahchesaray accepted a constitution of the 
Crimean state.89   
The Bolshevics realized the danger of Crimean secession from the newly 
proclaimed soviet state.  As a preemptive strike, they first seized control over the local 
government of Sevastopol; later on, naval squadrons landed at Feodosia and Kerch, and 
forward toward Bahcesaray and Simferopol.90  Finally, the Bolshevics advanced to 
Simferopol, defeated units of the Tatar cavalry and disbanded Kurultai.  Thus, the Tatars’ 
dreams about their own statehood had become a reality for the first time since 1783 for 
only several months.  However, it was the same for the first Bolshevic administration as 
well until “the German occupation forces destroyed it.”91   
During the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921, Crimea was the arena for struggling 
interest groups.  The Tatars had received no respect for their interests from the both the 
Bolshevics and the Whites,92 the Volunteer Army comprised of former tsarists military.  
Neither side was interested in having Crimea become independent; each of them saw 
Russia unified under their own set of ideas.  Finally, in October of 1920, the Bolshevics 
occupied Crimea and stayed there until the German invasion of 1941. 
2. Crimea in the Soviet Union 
In the Soviet Union, Crimea received a status of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic and, administratively (Crimean ASSR), it was a part of the Russian 
Socialist Federative Republic (RSFSR).93  For that time, the Crimean Tatars constituted 
about one-fourth of the Crimean ASSR population.  The autonomy was limited and 
Moscow remained in charge of most of the Crimean activities, with the probable 
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exception of issues of justice, education, and healthcare.  Two important port cities, 
Sevastopol and Evpatoria, were excluded from the Crimean jurisdiction and were 
subordinated directly to Moscow.   
Crimea, along with many other areas of the Soviet Union, experienced two 
famines, one during 1921-22 and the other during 1932-33.  It was primarily caused by 
the disastrous effects of the Soviet rule.94  For the former case, private property was 
abolished in 1921.95  For the latter, the Stalin’s pushed forward a policy of 
collectivization after abolishing the right for private property.  Both undertakings ended 
up with reduced effectiveness in agricultural production, causing food shortages, already 
multiplied by food confiscations and its transfers for the sake of the policy of 
industrialization.   
During World War II, Crimea was relatively easy, with the exception of 
Sevastopol which heroically resisted until July 1942, occupied by the Germans, 
Romanians, and Italians for the period of time from 1941-1944.  Immediately after 
Crimea came back under the Soviet control in early 1944, Stalin ordered a deportation of 
the Crimean Tatars and other smaller minorities as collective punishment for their 
collaboration with the Nazis.  In 1967, the Tatars were rehabilitated but banned from 
returning back to Crimea.96 
The Crimean ASSR was abolished in 1945 and was reorganized into the Crimean 
Oblast’ of the RSFSR.  In 1954, it was transferred under the jurisdiction of Ukrainian 
SSR due to close geographic, economic, and cultural ties to Ukraine, and as a friendly 
gesture symbolizing the 300th anniversary of the treaty which unified Russia and 
Ukraine.97  During the years after WWII and up until the dissolution of the USSR, the 
Crimea was developed as the tourist destination and the base for the Black Sea Fleet 
(BSF). 
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Under the Soviet Union the demographics of Crimea changed significantly.  
Hunger from the 1921-22 famine resulted in a population decrease of more than 21 
percent.98  One hundred thousand people died of starvation (60 percent of them were 
Crimean Tatars) and fifty thousand, mainly the Tatars, fled abroad.  As of 1923, 25 
percent (one hundred fifty thousand) of the Crimean population were the Tatars.99  
Thirty-five to forty thousand Crimean Tatars were removed to Siberia as part of Stalin’s 
attack on Crimean Tatars nationalism; pre-war the Crimean Tatars population was about 
three hundred-two thousand, and in late 1970s fewer than twelve hundred Tatar families 
were registered in Crimea.   
Such a dramatic shift was caused by the deportation of the Tatars and other 
minorities.  The deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other minorities from Crimea was 
initiated by Stalin in 1944 after the liberation of Crimea by the Soviet Army and will be 
studied in detail later in this thesis.  During the German occupation of Crimea some 
15,000-20,000 Crimean Tatars served for the Germans to fight partisans in the Crimean 
Mountains.100  Fisher refers to different estimates of about 20,000-53,000 Crimean Tatars 
fighting against Germany in the Red Army and up to twelve thousand in the resistance 
and the underground.101  Stalin disregarded the Crimean Tatar participation in the Great 
Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and ordered their deportation to Central Asia. 
3. Crimea as Part of Independent Ukraine 
The history of Crimea as part of independent Ukraine will be discussed later in 
this thesis in Chapter III.  However, several points need to be mentioned upfront:  
• With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited Crimea, a 
region with untypical demographics in comparison to its other regions;  
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• Not long before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars, the 
nation in exile, began to return to Crimea en masse, further exacerbating 
difficult economic, political, and ethnic situation there; and  
• The former Soviet Black Sea Fleet was stationed mostly in Crimea, and 
Russia did not want to lose its assets and opportunities they were receiving 
in the Black Sea region.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Crimea possesses an important place in the Black Sea region.  The history of 
Crimea was shaped by its important location, and made it the aim and the arena for 
interstate competition.  It was a crossroad for different cultures, religions, and peoples 
with different levels of socioeconomic development.  Ukraine with the Crimea, as an 
integral part of the state territory, inherited the set of territorial, political, social and 
economic problems predetermined by its history.   
In the times considered as modern history, Crimea was the edge of the Golden 
Horde, Russian, Ottoman empires, and the Soviet Union.  Each side of a dispute —
Crimean Tatars, Russians, and Ukrainians — spins around and refers to and interprets the 
history to justify its own policy.  Interrelations between aristocrats of the Golden Horde 
and the Islamic and Nomadic tribes gave way to the emergence of a semi-autonomous 
Crimean Tatar state in 1475.  Despite the fact that it was a protector of the Ottoman 
Turks, the Khanate of Crimea was considered the pinnacle of Crimean Tatar history.   
Territorially Crimea fell under Russian rule in 1783 and remained that way up 
until 1954, when it was transferred to Ukraine.  During those times the ethnic 
composition of the Crimean peninsula changed dramatically.  Both the forced and natural 
influx of Russians marginalized the Crimean Tatars presence to a mere 26 percent in 
1921.  Deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other minorities further diminished the 
Crimean Tatars presence there.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Ukraine with the legacy of unresolved 
military, economic, political, and ethnic problems and made Crimea a conflict prone area. 
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III. CRIMEA’S IMPORTANCE TO SECURITY IN THE BLACK 
SEA REGION 
A. SYMBOLIC AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CRIMEA FOR 
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 
Crimea has strategic and symbolic importance for both Ukraine and Russia, 
sufficiently so that any disagreement over Crimea might trigger an intra-state conflict 
between them.102 There are many examples of bloody intra-state conflicts among former 
communist states:  Bosnia, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Nakhichevan, 
Dagestan, Transdnestria, and Karabakh are lands artificially divided for the sake of 
politics and ideas in which such a conflict has erupted.  Crimea represents “a complex 
territorial challenge”103 along similar lines, based on historic myths and embellishments, 
as well as contemporary developments.  There are several state actors and an abundance 
of non-state actors involved in the Crimean question.  State actors — Ukraine, Russia, 
and (to a much lesser extent) Turkey — and the most prominent non-state actor and 
ethnic group, the Crimean Tatars, will shape the possible outcomes in the Crimean 
peninsula. Crimea is also important geopolitically to the U.S. because “whoever controls 
Crimea, will attempt to impose its will on all ongoing events in the region, because 
Crimea is the major gateway to the entire Slavonic world.”104  In an energy-hungry world 
the Black Sea Region is a regional hub for the distribution of oil and natural gas.105 
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To date, actual conflict in Crimea has been averted despite ample opportunities 
for violence arising from “a clash between Ukraine and Russia, an intraregional political 
conflict among ethnopolitical groups, internecine conflict among the Crimean Russian 
elites, and a center-periphery conflict between Kiev and Simferopol.”106  Yet the 
plausibility of a conflict involving the Crimean Tatars is high.  It is in the remission stage 
and can explode if not addressed properly. 
1. Importance of Crimea to Turkey  
Crimea is important to Turkey mostly symbolically and, to a certain extent, 
geopolitically.  In theory, the possibility of Crimea’s secession to Turkey exists, but has 
“not yet entered Crimean political debate.”107  The history of Crimea provides certain 
grounds for that.  The Crimean Tatars enjoy official support by the Turkish Government 
and tacit support from the extensive — five108 to seven109 million — Crimean Tatar 
Diaspora in Turkey.  Since 1998, the Turkish government, through the Crimean office of 
Turkish Agency for International Cooperation, has been involved in the construction of 
mosques and accommodations for returning Tatars; Turkey also grants scholarships for 
the Crimean Tatars to get higher education in Turkey.110  
The ‘Crimean Turks’ — the name for the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Turkey — 
are presently well integrated into the Turkish society, and are not very active in 
supporting the Crimean Tatars in Crimea.  Turkish scholar Filiz Tutku Aydin provides an 
explanation for this.111  First of all, the Diaspora Tatars speak Turkish not Crimean Tatar, 
and did not identify with Crimea up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Currently, 
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Crimean Turks are attempting to recover their identity as Crimean, but they are only in 
the initial stage.  Second, the idea of Crimean Tatar nationalism is popular among the 
elites, not at the grass roots level.  Third, the dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the 
Iron Curtain and allowed increasing social and political ties between the Crimean and 
Diaspora Tatar community. 
In geopolitical terms, Turkey and Russia are “eternal rivals” who want “to play 
the dominant role in the Black Sea region.”112  Since 1991, Russia’s position has 
weakened there and, following this logic, Turkey tried to take advantage of the situation.  
Turkey spread its influence over Turkish-speaking former Soviet republics and initiated 
the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992 to strengthen its 
leading position in the Black Sea region.113  However, the lack of resources at the 
disposal of Turkish government and the emergence of a Russia-Greece-Bulgaria 
alliance114 in the BSEC almost leveled its regional leadership.  Despite the negative 
results from attempts to establish regional leadership, Turkey carefully watches the 
developments in Crimea in order to take advantage of possible errors of Ukraine’s 
policy.115  This does not necessarily mean that Turkey seeks to weaken Ukraine, its ally 
in balancing Russia.  It might reinforce its own position in bilateral relations. 
The Turkish government is friendly to Ukraine and, at least declaratively, 
supports its territorial unity against Russia’s claims for the Black Sea Fleet and the 
Crimean peninsula, but its policies may still destabilize the situation with the Crimean 
Tatars.116  Individual assistance by members of the Diaspora is less controllable by the 
governments and might be directed both for good and for bad.   
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2. Importance of Crimea to Russia 
Crimea is significant to Russia ethnically, militarily, symbolically, and 
economically.  Russia’s attempts to open a consulate in Simferopol, to grant Russian 
citizenship to ethnic Russians living in Crimea, to establish a permanent representation of 
Russian parliament in the Crimean parliament and vise versa117 in the 1990s emphasizes 
the importance of Crimea to Russia.  
a. Ethnic Importance of Crimea 
Russia’s nationalist extremists argue that the majority of the population in 
Crimea is ethnic Russians.  The cause of protecting ethnic Russians in non-Russian states 
encourages some Russian Generals and politicians to intervene in potentially troubled 
regions.118  This was the case in Transdnistria and other places.  In Crimea, Russian 
Admirals supported pro-Russian nationalists, at least rhetorically, and their support had 
never been at the same level as in other areas of ethnic tensions in the former Soviet 
Union.  Still, Russian Generals and Admirals are not well in control of democratically 
elected civilians.  Admirals in Sevastopol enjoy a certain level of freedom, at least in the 
economic sphere.  Civil-Military relations in Russia are not democratic and the Russian 
Parliament is not yet in control of the military.119 
Former President Yeltsin, who was much softer than his successor Putin, 
linked withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia and Estonia with “greater minority 
rights” for ethnic Russians.120  These claims, however, have not materialized in any 
considerable way in Crimea.  The situation, aggravated by the constant conflicts between 
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ethnic Russians and returned Crimean Tatars who lack jobs and housing, provides 
additional justification for Russia’s hard tone towards Ukraine. 
b. Military Importance of Crimea 
Russia possesses an extensive military infrastructure in Crimea, and values 
Sevastopol as a warm-water naval base.121  Sevastopol was intended to be a naval base 
from the very beginning of its establishment in the eighteenth century and went through 
significant modernization to achieve its present military infrastructure.  It would take a 
long time and considerable financial resources to rebuild the same facilities on the 
Russian shores of the Black Sea.   
Crimea is an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’122 that has recently become 
home to twenty-one SU-24M front-line bombers, capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons.123  Crimea provides great advantages for Russia in attempts to regain its 
dominance in the Black Sea region, despite significantly narrowed basing options for the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF).  Currently, in Ukraine the Russian BSF still retains three 
out of ten basing points of the former Soviet BSF and three out of thirteen airfields.124   
In military and strategic terms, Russia claims that its BSF plays an 
important role in protecting “the southern flank of Russia and Ukraine from Turkey and 
NATO.”125  However, that is not true due to aging hardware (some refer to the ships of 
the BSF as “the world’s largest naval museum”126) and insufficient funding of the 
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Russian Navy.  Moreover, Ukraine holds the largest ship repair facilities in the former 
Soviet Union, whose services are offered to Russia for market prices.127  RBSF units 
hold some navigation facilities in Crimea to serve dual purposes — to maintain marine 
passenger and merchant routs and serve the RBSF.128 
c. Historic and Symbolic Importance of Crimea 
“Historically both the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea itself are of great 
symbolic significance to many Russian politicians.”129  Catherine the Great established 
the BSF in 1771 and Russia, after success in conflicts with the Ottomans, through a treaty 
acquired the right to base it in the Black Sea.  Former Commander of the Russian BSF, 
Admiral Victor Kravchenko, called the Black Sea a ‘Russian Ocean,’ referring to 
Russia’s long and successful “struggle for the possession of the Black Sea.”130  Songs, 
poems and books, and memorials about Sevastopol as the city of Russian glory and the 
city of Russian sailors are signs of its symbolic importance to Russia.131  Maintaining the 
presence of the RBSF in Crimea Russia achieves a symbolic goal.  It stresses that Russia 
extends to Crimea, and Ukraine is not as separate and independent as it wants to claim.132  
Moreover, some high-ranking Russian officials used new tactics in response to a recent 
series of statements about the withdrawal of the RBSF from Ukraine in 2017.  Russian 
Ambassador to Ukraine, Victor Chernomyrdin, made a statement that Crimean Tatars are 
waiting for the RBSF withdrawal in order to claim wider autonomy within Ukraine, and 
then for full independence; he also hypothesized that Ukraine will beg Russia to leave its 
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fleet in Ukraine, due to the inability of local officials to deal with the problem.133  In 
attempt to restore the leading role of Russia over the ‘near abroad,’ some Russian 
politicians employed the term ‘Russian heritage’134 as the criterion for evaluation of 
friendliness of a NIS to Russia.  Attempts to expel the BSF from Sevastopol deny 
Russia’s mythmaking about Russian and Soviet naval glory.135  Ukraine’s request to join 
NATO seriously undermines the claim of ‘Russian heritage’ in Ukraine and Crimea, and 
has revitalized claims among Russian nationalists to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine. 
d. Economic Importance of Crimea 
Twenty-five percent of Russian foreign trade travels across the Black Sea 
via Ukraine.136  It also requires port facilities in Ukraine to process the goods. In 
addition, “the BSEC countries account for 15-16 percent of Russia’s trade.”137  Thus, the 
Crimean ports are important for ensuring uninterruptible commodities flow to the region, 
while the only modern port on the Russian Black Sea cost, Novorossiysk,138 is not 
operational for approximately two winter months.  Moreover, in the Soviet Union, 
Crimea was a major tourist destination.  Russian business might be interested in investing 
in the Crimean tourist infrastructure.   
The republics of the former Soviet Union were connected by economic 
interdependence.  After its dissolution, Yeltsin invented the term ‘near abroad’ for the 
former Soviet space and attempted to declare that entire geopolitical space as a zone of 
Russian interests.  Ukraine and Crimea are not an exception from the rule and, besides 
other interests, constitute a zone of its economic interests.  
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3. Importance of Crimea to Ukraine 
“Developments in Crimea are significant to Ukraine in terms of more than simply 
traditional security concerns.”139  Ukraine’s capacity to maintain stability in Crimea 
generates certain political implications and a precedent for dealing with other challenges 
Ukraine is facing since it gained independence.  Crimea is also significant to Ukraine 
economically and strategically.  Economically, Crimea is subsidized by Ukraine, but has 
a huge potential to be profitable.  Strategically, Crimea is almost a centre of the Black 
Sea, facilitating rapid access to any part of it.  A number or scholars agree that Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity and state-building efforts are threatened not from outside but from 
inside due to internal political instability in general, and in Crimea in particular.140 
a. Political Importance of Crimea 
Successful settlement of the Crimea question would bring several political 
dividends to Ukraine.  First, Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s pressure on Crimean 
issues adds significance to its standing as a newly independent state.   A good deal was 
accomplished in this direction with the overcoming of the waves of Crimean separatism 
in 1992-95, and the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty with Russia on Friendship and 
Cooperation in May 1997.  However, state-building efforts are still in progress with the 
integration of the Crimean Tatars and other minorities — Armenians, Germans, 
Bulgarians and Greeks — who have returned to Ukraine from exile.  Thus, Ukraine is 
still in the process of acquiring political maturity by dealing with the minorities issue in 
Crimea. 
Second, Ukraine itself is a divided nation.141  Primarily, the crisis of 
identity among the Ukrainians divides them between West and East, whose inhabitants 
are respectively pro-Western and pro-Russian in their preferences. Ukraine is also 
divided religiously between Christians (the majority of Russians, Ukrainians and others) 
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and Muslims (Crimean Tatars).  Christians are divided between the Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic Churches, and even Orthodox are separated into two main branches — the ones 
subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate and the other to the Kievan Patriarchate.  
Samuel Huntington noted these divisions in his essay “The Clash of Civilizations?”142 
Huntington, who visited Ukraine several times, drew a fault line which runs right across 
Ukraine and divides Western Christianity and Orthodoxy (under Russia’s patronage) plus 
Islam (Crimean Tatars and other Muslim minorities of the former USSR). 
The geostrategic place of Ukraine is such that the more unstable Ukraine 
becomes, the higher its importance because it is the key for all of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Huntington’s argument, however fatalistic, presents a daunting prognosis for the 
immature Ukrainian state, especially in light of growing calls for federalization of 
Ukraine, and the inability of the government to solve Crimean Tatar problems.  If 
Huntington’s prediction came true, instability and ethnic turmoil might spread to the new 
EU members, bordering Ukraine against which no new ‘iron curtain’ could be erected. 
The third dividend is derivative from the former two.  Ukraine is eager to 
move toward the West, to NATO and the European Union (EU).  If it remains as 
politically unstable143 as it is currently, its Euro-Atlantic aspirations will remain 
unattainable.  
b. Economic Importance of Crimea 
Despite the fact that Crimea is currently subsidized by Ukraine,144 the 
Black Sea region and Crimea are considered to have the potential to boost Ukraine’s 
                                                 
142 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 
http://history.club.fatih.edu.tr/103%20Huntington%20Clash%20of%20Civilizations%20full%20text.htm 
(accessed February 1, 2008). 
143 Taras Kuzio, “European, Eastern Slavonic, and Eurasian: National Identity, Transformation, and 
Ukrainian Foreign Policy,” in Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., (Westport, Connecticut: Praguer Publishers, 2002), 206. 
This will provide details on the positions of Slavophiles (pro-Russian) and Westernizers (anti-Russian and 
neutral to Russia). 
144 Svitlytsia.crimea.ua, “Arseniy Yatseniuk: Ya Kategorychno Proty Bud’-Yakykh 
Samozakhoplen’…” Kryms’ka Svitlytsya, #5, February 1, 2008, 
http://svitlytsia.crimea.ua/index.php?section=article&artID=5526 (accessed February 4, 2008). In 2007 
UAH 800 million ($160 million) came directly from the budget of Ukraine to subsidize Crimea.  
 32
economic growth by increased tourism, maritime transportation, exploitation of the Black 
Sea and the Crimean peninsula oil and natural gas resources, and as a transit area to 
Russian, Caucasus, and Central Asia goods.  The tourism business has the biggest 
potential for development.  Crimea was a vacation playground for the Soviet elite and a 
popular tourist destination before the Soviet Union collapsed.145  Currently, the tourist 
infrastructure of Crimea is in bad shape, but if the region were to become stable and the 
infrastructure undergoes renovation and restructuring, tourism’s 8.2 percent share in 
Ukrainian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1998146 might be higher.   
Ukrainian ports, Sevastopol among them, are closer to Russian 
manufacturers than Russian ones.  This fact, multiplied by the reduced tariffs in 
Ukrainian ports,147 might divert the flow of goods from Novorossiysk.  Russian intent to 
build a bridge over the Kerch Strait to connect Russia and Crimea148 supports this 
hypothesis.  Crimea has significant amounts of natural gas and oil.  However, the energy 
sector of Ukrainian economy is not efficient, mostly due to its obsolescence.  If it gets 
modernized, Russia’s share in the Ukrainian energy market might decrease, reducing 
dependency. 
c. Strategic Importance of Crimea 
As a newly independent state, Ukraine is in search of its place in the 
geopolitical space.  The Black Sea region is important as a link to South Eastern Europe 
and, through Turkey, to the Middle East.  Participation in pipeline projects distributing 
Caspian and Central Asian energy resources allows Ukraine to reduce its dangerous 
dependence on Russian energy.  Finding a workable solution for the Crimean problems 
makes Ukraine more attractive to foreign investments, including from other states of the 
Black Sea region. 
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Like its Russian counterpart, the Ukrainian Navy enjoys year-round access 
to a warm water base and other military facilities left over from the Soviet Union times.  
This contributes to more effective and efficient maritime operations to secure trade routes 
and control and defense sea lines in the Black Sea region.  Moreover, if Crimea is not 
Ukrainian, it would much easier become a source of drug and human trafficking from 
Caucasus and Central Asia, an influx of refugees to southern regions of Ukraine, and a 
source of other security concerns. 
The other angle of strategic importance of Crimea to Ukraine lies in 
creating a precedent to deal with West-East divide in Ukraine.  In Crimea, the expectation 
for ethnic conflict is high.  Conflict-prone Crimea is often compared with Transdnistria, 
Abkhazia, and even Chechnya.149 If Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and Russian nationalism 
get reconciled in Crimea, it may provide a model for the broader reconciliation of 
western and eastern Ukraine.   
B. UKRAINE’S POLICY IN CRIMEA SINCE 1991  
1. Developments in Ukraine – Crimea Context before 2004 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Crimea became an integral part of the 
newly independent state of Ukraine.  Crimea is an atypical region of Ukraine for several 
reasons. Ethnically, Crimea was the only region in Ukraine with a substantial majority of 
Russians.150  Culturally Crimea was Russified;151 even its administration still utilizes 
Russian in its paperwork, despite the fact that the only official language in Ukraine is 
Ukrainian.152  Historically, at least from the Russian point of view, Crimea was a part of 
Russia until Khrushchev, ethnic Russian and the former leader of Ukraine, transferred it 
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to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Crimea is the home for the BSF and 
Sevastopol is still considered as “the city of Russian glory.”153   
Crimea was “considered a hot spot”154 posing a considerable threat to the unity of 
the Ukrainian state.  In 1991, while Crimean oblast’ was a part of the Ukrainian SSR, its 
local authorities arranged a referendum to establish the Crimean Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR)155 within the Soviet Union, with the support of more than 80 
percent of the population.156  The legal legitimacy for the referendum is questionable, 
because “no referendum law was in existence at the time neither in the Soviet Union nor 
in Ukraine.”157  Yet it reflected undeniable demographic facts. 
The Crimean Tatars’ influence upon the referendum’s result equated to zero.  At 
that time the Tatars constituted a tiny segment of the Crimean population.  In the spring 
of 1987 there were only 17,400158 Crimean Tatars out of the more than two million of 
Crimea’s population.  They were granted the right of return to the homeland before the 
Soviet Union collapsed, and by June of 1991 the Crimean Tatar population had increased 
to one hundred thirty-five thousand.159  In addition, most Tatars boycotted the 
referendum160 because they preferred to remain as a part of Ukraine.161   
Despite the absence of any legal grounds for the referendum, the authorities in 
Kiev accepted the voice of the Crimean population to a certain extent — the Ukrainian 
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parliament gave the peninsula the status of autonomous republic to calm the moves 
toward returning Crimea under the jurisdiction of the RSFSR.162  After Ukraine 
proclaimed independence on August 24, 1991, the Crimean Supreme Soviet (the 
parliament) confirmed the sovereignty of the peninsula as a part of Ukraine.163  The 
collapse of the Soviet single party system in turn paved the way for the development of 
diverse political forces with different agendas. 
The Republican Movement of Crimea (the Russian acronym RDK) emerged right 
after Ukraine declared its independence, with the objective to ensure Crimea’s secession 
from Ukraine and to serve as a counterbalance for the Ukrainian National Assembly 
(UNA) activities in Crimea.  The RDK demanded a new referendum to establish an 
independent Republic of Crimea and started collecting the signatures for referendum 
according to the requirements of the newly adopted Law of Ukraine On Referenda.  The 
commander of the BSF also supported the RDK.164  Their demands received substantial 
support among the Crimean population fueled by the march of Galician nationalists 
“tearing down Russian and Soviet flags and holding placards bearing inscriptions such as 
‘Crimea for the Ukrainians.’”165  The Communist Party of Crimea (CPC, lead by Leonid 
Grach, later the speaker for the Crimean parliament) and Russian Language Society, in 
coordination with the chair of the Crimean parliament, Nikolai Bagrov, saw themselves 
as a reaction to Ukrainian nationalism.166 
Such developments in Crimea worried Ukrainian officials.  It was easy to predict 
the outcome of a new referendum if one were to be held.  Ironically, they dismissed the 
idea using the same arguments Gorbachev used for holding together the disintegrating 
Soviet Union, claiming the lack of an adequate legal basis, illegality, fear of economic 
decline, and threatening legal prosecution for challenging the territorial integrity of the  
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state.  Moreover, the authorities feared that Crimean secessionism would create a 
precedent for secessionism of the other regions of the former Ukrainian SSR, such as 
Novorossia and Donbass.167 
In April 1992 the Ukrainian parliament adopted the law ‘On the Status of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea’ giving it wider powers in comparison to the other 
territorial bodies of Ukraine.168  In response, in May of 1992 “the Crimean parliament 
adopted a Constitution plus a Declaration of Independence,” however, claiming both that 
the proclaimed Crimean republic is a part of the Ukrainian republic and that the 
relationship between the two ‘independent’ republics should nevertheless be based upon 
treaties.169   
The existence of two notionally independent states, one of which (Crimea) is a 
part of another (Ukraine) contradicts conventional wisdom.  In his comments to the law 
granting autonomy to Crimea, a leading Ukrainian legal expert, A. Matsiuk, pointed out 
that on one side, a delineation of power between a state and its constituent parts is 
impossible, but on the other side, Crimea was granted wide powers.170  It was done 
primarily for the sake of recognizing the dominant national group in Crimea, the 
Russians,171 and also to co-opt separatists by granting them a certain level of authority 
and independence within Ukraine.  The Justice Minister at the time, Serhii Holovatiy, 
expressed the opinion that two republics and two constitutions within one country will 
lead to its federalization.172   
The idea of creating a true Crimean republic was strongly rejected in Kiev, where 
some political parties demanded that Crimean legislature be dissolved and its leadership 
arrested.  The Crimean Declaration of Independence was annulled by the Ukrainian 
parliament, the powers of presidential representatives to Crimea were extended, and the 
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parliament addressed the Crimean populace with a clear message about the strong resolve 
of Ukraine not to allow any moves toward Crimean secession from Ukraine.173  As a 
result, the Crimean parliament fulfilled the demands of Kiev. 
The years of 1991–1994 were ones of open confrontation between Simferopol and 
Kiev.  Subsequent years became ones of increasing stability.174  The idea of Crimean 
independence faded away, and was replaced in the RDK and among some other pro-
Russian political forces by the idea of Crimean unification with Russia.  Nevertheless, 
although the separatists won an important victory during the Crimean presidential 
election in 1994, the RDK leader Yuri Meshkov, who won the election admitted “that he 
would not press for Crimea’s separation from Ukraine.”175   
Even so, Meshkov undertook certain risky steps toward rapprochement with 
Russia.  Some of them were symbolic — the change of time to Russian, and some more 
substantive — the subordination of the security forces in Crimea to the Crimean republic, 
establishment of a ruble zone, retention of the BSF under the Russian control, and 
withdrawal of Ukrainian security forces from Crimea.176  
The political position of President Meshkov and his Russia bloc (RB) was 
reinforced with the results of Crimean parliamentary elections in March 1994.  The 
elections ended up with the RB having fifty-four seats out of the ninety-eight total.177  
But the success was short lived. President Meshkov and his RB were unable to solve 
pressing economic problems and lacked political experience, even as more extreme 
separatism diverted public support away from them.  One year later, during the June 1995 
local elections, “not a single council chairman was elected from the Russia bloc.”178 
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The Crimean Tatars refused to recognize the Presidency of Yuri Meshkov and 
were disappointed in Kiev’s acquiescence in his victory.179  They saw this as one more 
piece of evidence of Ukraine’s leadership indifference to the Tatars’ interests.  During the 
parliamentary elections, the Kurultai (Crimean Tatar Assembly) won fourteen seats 
claiming their support to Ukraine’s integrity with the remark that “we again appear to be 
better interests of the Ukrainian state than the Ukrainian themselves.”180  However, the 
Tatars were not unified in their political views.  The pro-Russian National Movement of 
Crimean Tatars was in alliance with the RB, but got only marginal support and no seats 
in the parliament.181  
The new constitution of Crimea was adopted after the abolition of the Crimean 
presidency and change of the leadership in its parliament.  The positive sign was in prior 
coordination of its draft with Ukrainian parliament.  The majority of its provisions were 
approved with the exception of the “separatist clauses” about “separate citizenship, state 
symbols, the ‘Crimean’ people, and proclamation of Russian as the state language.”182 
On October 21, 1998, the Crimean parliament adopted the fifth version of the 
Crimean Constitution.  There were nothing about separatism in it, and Ukrainian 
language was recognized as the state language.  On December 23, 1998, it was adopted 
by the Ukrainian parliament and was considered as the most pro-Ukrainian in the history 
of Ukraine-Crimea relations.183  Two days later, the Russian parliament ratified the 
Ukrainian-Russian Treaty, acknowledging the rights of Ukraine on Crimea as part of 
Ukraine.184 
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2. Developments in Ukraine–Crimea Relations Since 2004  
The election of the strong Euro-Atlantacist Victor Yushchenko,185 as President of 
Ukraine, altered more or less stable relations between Russia and Ukraine, which “will 
probably not be maintained to the same extent.”186 During his first visit to Russia after 
being elected, President Yushchenko stated that Ukraine’s relations with Russia will be 
built on the primacy of Ukrainian interests.187  This event influenced the relations for the 
worse between Ukraine and Russia, as Russia strives to maintain its leadership position 
over the ‘near abroad,’ the overarching term for the former Soviet republics.  
However, 2004’s ‘Orange Revolution’ largely bypassed Crimea and did not 
change Crimean politics significantly.188  Presidential elections of 2004-2005 and 
Parliamentary elections of 2006 confirmed that assumption.  During the two ‘usual’ 
rounds and one extra round, imposed due to the Ukrainian Supreme Court decision that 
fraud had been committed on behalf of Yushchenko’s main competitor, Victor 
Yanukovych, Yushchenko acquired slightly more than 15 percent of votes versus 81 
percent in support for Yanukovych; the gap between the two was even wider in 
Sevastopol.189  
The ‘Orange Revolution’ did not bring any better life for the Crimean Tatars.  
Kurultai leadership decided to support Yushchenko and the political forces associated 
with him, but the rest of the Crimean population, as it is seen in the election results, 
supported the opposite side.  Such an obvious divide shoved Crimea to the edge of new 
ethnic tensions, like those experienced in the 1990s.  The Tatars might not support 
Yushchenko, but he looked less threatening to them.  At least he was against the 
rapprochement with Russia, a state generating bad memories among the Crimean Tatars.   
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The ‘Orange Revolution’ generated international support for Ukraine, and 
overshadowed the Crimean Tatars’ problems. 9/11, Chechnya, and the war in Iraq also 
produced fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism.  Even in mid-90s rumors were floating 
around about Chechen terrorists resting in Crimea.190  Later, Hizb ut-Tahrir emerged in 
Crimean ground; many experts considered Crimea the only place in Europe where it 
operates openly, due to flaws in Ukrainian legislation. 191  The U.S.-led ‘War on Terror’ 
further exacerbated the situation with Crimean Tatar political and cultural claims.  As a 
result, the Crimean Tatar leadership refused any help from Islamic groups with the aim of 
not compromising themselves. 
The Crimean Tatar leadership, who supported Yushchenko during the presidential 
elections of 2004-05, asked for reciprocity in support of their grievances.  The Crimean 
Tatars were concerned with the recognition of them as an ‘indigenous people,’ giving the 
Crimean Tatar language the status of the official language in Crimea along with 
Ukrainian, and settling land disputes.192  As a result, Yushchenko set up a commission to 
find a way out of that complicated situation, but it ended without any noteworthy 
solution.193  In late 2005, however, the newly appointed Crimean prime minister and 
Yushchenko’s ally, Anatoliy Bordiunov, formed a Cabinet with an increased number of 
Crimean Tatars.  Six Crimean Tatars occupied positions as deputy prime ministers (two), 
ministers (two), and heads of committees (two).194  
The 2006 parliamentary elections reduced the hopes of the Crimean Tatars of 
being represented in Crimean and local assemblies due to changes in electoral legislation 
in Ukraine which provided for 100 percent proportional representation, in contrast to the 
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mixed system that had existed in the past, and which allowed some small local majorities 
to prevail.  Again, as it was during presidential elections of 2004-05, the Crimean Tatar 
leadership affiliated itself with pro-Yushchenko political forces — Our Ukraine and 
Narodnyi Rukh (Peoples’ Movement).  The Kurultai (Crimean Tatar assembly) proved its 
authority over the majority of the Crimean Tatar population by persuading them to vote 
for the pro-Yushchenko bloc.  On the national level the Crimean Tatars gained 2 seats in 
the Ukrainian Parliament (for Mustafa Dzemilev and Refat Chubarov, the Leader of 
Mejelis and his deputy); on the Crimean level they got eight seats.195 
The score of two representatives on the national level corresponds to the Crimean 
Tatar population to the Ukrainian population ratio.196  However, the ratio for the Crimean 
assembly was lower then expected.197  It can be explained by the split among the 
Crimean Tatars.198  The Crimean Tatar Bloc, a rival Crimean Tatar party led by Edir 
Gafarov, made an alliance with the Union Party (formerly part of the Crimean Russian 
bloc, forced to be re-registered as Ukrainian Party according to Ukrainian legislation)199 
and diverted some Crimean Tatar votes from Yushchenko supporters.  Moreover, the 
anti-Yushchenko Party of Regions and the United Social Democratic party declaratively 
addressed Crimean Tatar issues in their electoral campaigns, and contributed to 
dispersing Crimean Tatar votes.   
Following the 2006 elections, the vast majority in the Crimean parliament 
constituted anti-Yushchenko political forces — eighty-four seats versus sixteen seats 
(eight seats for Tymoshenko bloc and eight seats for Rukh (Our Ukraine)).200  Thus, the 
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Crimean legislature was against Yushchenko’s policy of Euro-Atlantic integration.  
These political forces organized anti-NATO manifestations, and resulted in canceling an 
already planned joint Ukraine-U.S. military exercise.201  The Sevastopol city council 
went even further, declaring the city as a NATO-free zone, and prohibiting any NATO 
servicemen from entering it.202   
The current situation in Crimea is marked by an intensification of pro-Russian 
attitudes among the majority of the population, increased activities of Islamists, and 
radicalization of the Crimean Tatars.  Pro-Russian attitudes among the majority of 
population can be seen in “total sabotage of the head of state’s [The President of Ukraine] 
decisions in Crimea,”203 demands of certain political groups in Crimea for Russia to 
grant Russian citizenship to ethnic Russians in Ukraine,204 and the fact that even 
Ukrainians in Crimea consider themselves Russian.205  The Crimean parliament is pro-
Russian by its composition and political parties. Representatives there have organized a 
rally with the mottos ‘Welfare of Ukraine is with Russia,’ and ‘The Future of Ukraine in 
a union with Russia,’206 and, as of February 2008, are under criminal investigation for 
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“calls for the violation of the country’s territorial integrity.”207   Mustafa Dzemilev, the 
Kurultai leader, pointed out that the Ukrainization of Crimea is no more then a myth; 
everything Ukrainian is suppressed, with 90 percent of schools and 100 percent of TV 
broadcast conducted in Russian.208   
There are several signs of increased activities of Islamists in Crimea.  Ukrainian 
legislation does not prohibit registration of the religious communities in Ukraine.  The 
mufti of the Crimean Muslims, Emirali Ablaev, pointed out that, contrary to the other 
states, “religious communities…preaching radicalism and extremism” are freely 
registered in Ukraine’s Crimea.209  In August 2007, Crimea hosted a conference of Hizb 
Al-Tahrir.210  The conference was about the establishment of a World Islamic Caliphate, 
and offered further evidence of fragmentation among the Crimean Tatars.  The leader of 
the Crimean Tatar Bloc, Edip Nafarov, stressed the normality of the conference agenda; 
on the contrary, the mufti of the Crimean Muslims characterized it as a sign of “evil to 
Muslims in Crimea,” and Dzemilev’s deputy, Refat Chubarov, tied the conference to 
attempts to discredit the Crimean Tatars just before the parliamentary elections.211   
The radicalization of the Crimean Tatars occurred because the Tatars did not see 
adequate support of their interests by the government, both on the state and local levels.  
Moreover, “the president’s party [Our Ukraine People’s Union]” accused “the Crimean 
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authorities and police of provoking ethnic conflicts.”212  It was about a series of anti-
Tatar events, namely a youth attack on a Crimean Tatar village and destruction of 
summer cafes by the police.  Moreover, Dzemilev stressed that the combination of the 
“lawlessness” toward the Crimean Tatars and the appearance of Wahhabi Muslims may 
turn a part of the Crimean Tatar population toward extremist movements.213  The main 
point of friction, the land issues, remains unresolved, and Dzemilev is very pessimistic on 
the prospective of solving this problem.214  Moreover, recently the Crimean Tatars opted 
to form national self-defense groups “intended to regulate the allotment of land plots in 
Crimea; the Mejlis meeting passed an affirmative draft resolution, which was finally 
vetoed by Dzemilev.215  Dzemilev made a conclusion that further radicalization of the 
Crimean Tatars may lead to the “second Chechnya” if the Mejelis will lose its authority, 
and “people may start forming radical groups.”216   
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Crimean experience within independent Ukraine can be conditionally divided 
into two periods, with the Orange Revolution of 2004 as the landmark.  The first period 
consist of two sub-periods: the period of 1992-1995 characterized by secession attempts 
initiated by pro-Russian political forces; and a second period from 1995-2004 
characterized by relative stabilization of secessionist attitudes.  The period since 2004 has 
in turn been characterized by the revival of conflict between Crimea and the central 
government.  This divide is conditional because Ukraine–Crimea relations have been 
uneven since Ukraine gained its independence.  Russo-Ukrainian relations, in disputes 
over Crimea, revolved around the rights of ethnic Russians in Crimea, the division of the 
Black Sea Fleet and its basing rights.  Finally, the return on the part of the Crimean 
Tatars from exile brought additional tensions to the region.  Land issues, restoration of 
rights of the Crimean Tatars, and interethnic relations further complicated the situation in 
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IV. CRIMEAN TATARS AND THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER 
NATIONS ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT AS A NATION 
A. CONTESTED ETHNOGENESIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS 
In the development of the ‘triangle of conflict,’ Russia-Crimea-Ukraine, Crimean 
Tatars play an important role.  Despite their relatively small numbers in Crimea, they are 
a significant player in Ukrainian domestic politics.  Their number of about 250,000, or 
roughly 12 percent217 of the Crimean population, is just the tip of the iceberg.  The Tatars 
are widely represented abroad.  For instance, in Turkey they number as many as 2 to 3 
million, and according to some sources, up to five to seven million.  Thus, the Crimean 
Tatars in Ukraine may be supported by Diasporas both morally and financially.   
1. The Ethnogenesis 
All parties of conflict present different theories of the Tatars descent.  To 
understand the grounds for the Crimean Tatars’ search for identity and statehood, the 
study of Crimean Tatar ethnogenesis is necessary. It is more or less an agreement among 
scholars that certain peoples populated Crimea and became what we know as Crimean 
Tatars somewhere in the fourteenth century with the Mongol Tatar invasion.218  
The ethnonym “Crimean Tatars” is obscure.219  Many ethnic groups with the 
second word ‘Tatar’ in the name of a group are scattered throughout the territories of the 
former Soviet Union and elsewhere.  Astrakhan Tatars, Kazan Tatars, Siberian Tatars, 
Bashkir Tatars, and many other Tatars are not the same people, but they were identified 
in the Russian lexicon since the thirteenth century “to refer to many different nomadic 
peoples coming to Rus’ from the East.”220  The ‘Tatars’ can be compared with the  
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‘Indians’ of the U.S., the collective term for the indigenous population of North America, 
which contained a multiplicity of different tribes, who distinguished themselves from one 
another. 
Two scholars speaking for the Crimean Tatars summarized and expressed their 
views on their ethnogenesis. Greta Lynn Uehling based her study of the interview of 
fifty-three individuals with the set of fifty questions asked “among different ethnic groups 
[Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, and Karaims] as well as Crimean Tatars 
deported from the Crimea in 1944 by Stalin.221  Brian G. Williams based his study on 
guidance of his “former adviser, a Dobruchan Turk, Professor Kemal Karpat.”222  
Uehling described historic Crimea as “home to flourishing Greek city-states, Genoese 
and Venetian trading colonies,” and the Crimean Tatars, who descended from the tribes 
of the Tavriis and Kimmerites, are “one of the indigenous peoples, along with the 
Karaims and Krymchaks (two Turkic Jewish minorities).”223 Williams described the 
Crimean Tatars as “an eclectic Turkish-Muslim ethnic group that claims direct descent 
from the Goths, Pontic Greecs, Armenians, the Tatars of the Golden Horde and other East 
European ethnic groups.”224 Crimean Tatar scholars also emphasize “the formative 
influence of geography…for the development of the indigenous group,” and assert the 
independence of the Crimean Khanate, as “a fully developed, pre-modern state,” from the 
fifteenth century onward.225  
2. Thoughts on the Proposed Crimean Tatar Ethnogenesis and Claims 
Based Upon It 
Construction of a common history, combining fact and mythology in varying 
degrees, is a characteristic means by which nations assert themselves.  In this regard the 
history of Crimea is very delicate, as Russians, Ukrainians, and the Crimean Tatars all try 
to create their own picture of who has more historic rights for the Crimean peninsula.  
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Russian historian Valeriy Vozgrin, in his largely pro-Crimean Tatar book Istoricheskie 
Sud’by Krymskikh Tatar (Historic Fates of the Crimean Tatars), argues that historic 
works are subjective to a certain extent and subject to distortion in light of contemporary 
political goals and issues.226  Moreover, Crimea is the multiethnic literary landscape,227 
and it is very hard to develop a consistent picture of past events. Crimean Tatar sources 
are the least precise, being chiefly oral in nature. “The written historical record [on the 
Crimean Tatars] prior to the early twentieth century is sparse.”228 National consciousness 
among the Crimean Tatars emerged in recognizably modern form only in the very late 
nineteenth century due to the efforts of Ismail Gaspirali, who is “commemorated as a 
founding father of the Crimean Tatar nation.”229   
Considering the Crimea as “home to flourishing Greek city-states, Genoese and 
Venetian trading colonies,” as Williams does, is perfectly right; but the Crimean Tatars 
did not help them flourish.  Alan Fisher pointed out that along the coast of the Crimean 
peninsula there were certain cities (Kaffa (Kefe, Feodosia today), Evpatoria (Gozleve), 
and Tana (Azov, Azak)) meeting “eastern European standards” of that time; they were 
inhabited by Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and “a sizeable Italian and Frankish minorities,” 
and “these cities were European in influence.”230 Sasse sites several travelers visiting 
Crimea in late eighteenth century, who reported the Crimean Tatars as 
“indolent…uneducated and unsophisticated.”231  
The claim that the Crimean Tatars, who descended from the tribes of the Tavriis 
and Kimmerites, are “one of the indigenous peoples, along with the Karaims and 
Krymchaks (two Turkic Jewish minorities) looks like a historical myth, corresponding to 
the idea that the deeper one dug into the history, the more rights one has for the disputed 
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piece of territory.232  But even from the point of view of national mythology, such claims 
are not necessarily the most important.  Vozgrin considers language the crucial milestone 
on the way to ethnic group development, so that the descent of ethnos can be studied 
through the success of the language used by the group.233 According to Vozgrin, 
Lithuania played a significant role in the emergence of the Crimean Tatar culture in the 
early part of the fourteenth century.  Lithuania pushed away the Golden Horde, which 
had been occupying the Black Sea steppes between Bug and Don.234  The Karaims and 
Tatars lived in Lithuania235 and the first Khan of the Crimean Khanate, Haci Giray, 
arrived from Lithuania with the consent of Casimir, the Grand Prince of Lithuania.   
Williams’ description of the Crimean Tatars as “an eclectic Turkish-Muslim 
ethnic group that claims direct descent from the Goths, Pontic Greecs, Armenians, the 
Tatars of the Golden Horde and other East European ethnic groups”236 is a good 
definition, but needs to be explained further.  Sasse points out that Greek colonizers 
arrived to Crimea in seventh century BC, dominating but not entirely displacing earlier 
Slav settlers.237  Thus, Crimea initially was settled by the Slavs.238  Her evidence, based 
on the observation of eighteenth century travelers, suggests that Crimea was an 
“ethnically segregated society” of “Armenians, Greek, Jews and others” who had lived 
there for ages; at the time, they “still preserve their national religion, customs and so on 
and do not seem to have mixed their blood in any considerable degree with the 
Tatars.”239  Even during the Golden Horde times, Slavs married Turkic women, but 
Slavic women had never married Tatar men willingly, because it was against the 
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Christian norm to be one of the numerous wives of one Muslim man.  This point 
contradicts any literal Tatar claim of ‘direct descent from the Goths, Pontic Greecs, and 
Armenians.’  Sasse pointed out that the Crimean Tatars, a heterogeneous group itself, 
acquired its cultural identity under the influence of Islam and the international Muslim 
community by the fifteenth century.240   
With respect to the “formative influence of geography…for the development of 
the indigenousness,” it may be noted that the Crimean peninsula consists of three 
different zones: “steppe, mountains and coast.”241  Two-thirds of it is covered by steppe, 
identical to the Ukrainian landscape.  Thus, the geography of most of the peninsula could 
not have contributed to the development of particular qualities pertinent to this region 
only.  Sasse uses the evidence of Evgenii Markov, the appointed director of the schools 
and colleges in Tavricheskaya Gubernia in 1865, who “saw Crimea as the part of 
“Malorossia” (Little Russia) [the other name for Ukraine, invented by Russia] and its 
inhabitants as closest to the khokhli [often used to name Ukrainians in Russian 
nationalistic slang], defined as the “inhabitants of the Black Sea steppe and south.”242  
The same may be said about the coast.  The Black Sea coast is extensive and it was not a 
particular feature of Crimea.  Thus, these geographic conditions were widespread in the 
close proximity to Crimea and did not contribute to the development of an indigenous 
group considerably different from the steppes and shores of contemporary Ukraine.  The 
Crimean mountains may be a small exception, though they are not very high (the highest 
peak is about five thousand feet) as to require extensive cultural adaptation to get 
adjusted to them.  The biggest contributor for the emergent group identity was 
undoubtedly Islamization, which contributed to the creation of “a collective cultural 
identity” for a wider Crimean Tatar group rather than the territory of Crimea.243 
The independence of the Crimean Khanate as “a fully developed, pre-modern 
state,” is based on “hearsay evidence” about “a Tatar-Ottoman Treaty” which stated “that 
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the Khan [Crimean] had complete internal power and could appoint his civilian and 
military officials.”244  Yet in reality, “many of the towns and harbors…of the Crimea 
passed under direct Ottoman control,” while “the Khan’s administration resembled the 
Ottoman governmental apparatus.” The diverse clans of the Crimea were controlled only 
due to a strong Ottoman Empire and Ottoman garrisons there,245 not the Khan’s 
authority.  Fisher notes that historic views of the Tatars see them in the best estimate as 
vassals on the Ottomans, and at worst as a semi-civilized society whose role was to attack 
and ruin the steppe, taking advantage of their more civilized and developed neighbors.246  
The latter image in strengthened by Vozgrin, who notes the dependence of the Crimean 
Khanate upon the archaic practices of the Ottomans themselves.247 
B. CAUSES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN CRIMEA 
The ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars is deeply contested in virtually every 
detail. But even so, it is hardly conceivable that Russians or Ukrainians, both relative 
newcomers under any circumstances, have more rights to the land of Crimea than the 
Crimean Tatars. In practice, the demographics of Crimea in modern times have changed 
constantly since the Russian annexation of the peninsula from the Ottomans in 1783.  The 
Crimean Tatars were forced to leave due to a new and less congenial environment created 
by new rulers who wish to eliminate or assimilate them.  This remained true during the 
Soviet period as well. 
1. Changes in Crimean Demographics Under the Russian Empire 
Russian policy toward the Crimean Tatars was initially moderate.  Catherine the 
Great, during whose reign the annexation occurred, fostered religious tolerance and an 
Islamic clergy to possess an influential position in Crimean society.  Tatar nobility was 
granted rights similar to those of Russian ruling class.  At the same time, she initiated a 
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policy of Russification, changing Tatar names to Russian, imposing the Russian 
administrative system and the settling of Christian colonists to the peninsula.  This 
contributed to the decline of the standard of life for Crimean Tatar nobility and ordinary 
people.  In terms of demographics, the Crimean Tatars constituted 83 percent of the total 
Crimean population in 1783.248   
Catherine’s administration in Crimea did not resist emigration of those who chose 
to leave.  Moreover, it tried to facilitate the Russification of Crimea.  Important trading 
centers, Kefe and Gozleve, were abandoned almost completely by the Tatars.  New 
Russian-built cities like Sevastopol took their place.249   
After the Crimean annexation by the Russian Empire, Crimean Tatar emigration 
was a relatively constant phenomenon.  It was difficult for the Crimean Tatar elite to 
adjust to Russian policy in Crimea.  For ordinary Tatars, it was mostly Russian land 
administration that caused an economic depression for peasants.250  The other reason laid 
in the “preventive displacement” of Tatars from the shores of the Black Sea during the 
Russo-Ottoman wars of 1806-1812 and 1828-1829.251   
“In the aftermath of the Crimean War of 1854-56, the pace of the Tatar exodus 
quickened.”252  This war saw the successful Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire, 
threatening the strategic Bosporus Straits.  To protect them, France, Britain and Sardinia 
joined the Ottomans in the war.  Allied forces landed in Crimea, finally destroying 
Sevastopol.  Despite the Crimean Tatar participation in the war against the Napoleonic 
invasion of 1812, they were not trusted by the Russian Empire leadership, and were 
accused of being in collaboration with the Turkish alliance in the fight against the 
Russian Army.  It is estimated that during the war 10,000 to 20,000 Tatars immigrated to 
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Turkey and another 20,000 were evacuated on departing allied ships.253  After the war, 
Russian Tsar Alexander II saw the Crimean Tatars as a source of danger and instability.  
In 1859 he ordered his administrators “to facilitate and encourage” their emigration.  As a 
result, “some 100,000 Crimean Tatars [who] had left the peninsula” by the end of 
1860.254   
Crimean Tatar emigration continued throughout the last decades of the Russian 
Empire.  It peaked between the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and 1902, when the 
emigration slowed due to the revival of “the intellectual movement [of] the influential 
Tatar reformer, Ismail Bey Gaspirali.”255  The numbers of those who emigrated were 
overwhelmed in any case by the natural growth of the Tatar population “from 100,000 in 
1861 to 196,854 by the 1890s.”256 
In sum, Russian imperial policy can not be seen as what is today called “ethic 
cleansing.”  After the annexation, political, administrative and economic situations have 
changed for the worse for the Crimean Tatars.  Many of the latter opted to leave for 
Turkey and other countries in search for better life, without any prohibition from the 
Russian Empire.  They did not always find it.  The Crimean Tatars who emigrated to 
Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, suffered the same systematic persecution as the 
Muslim populations in the Serb dominated areas of Bosnia and Kosovo.257 
2. Revival of the Crimean Tatar Identity and Demographics 
During the late nineteenth century, the Tatar cultural identity was threatened due 
to the emigration of the Tatar intelligentsia and nobility, and impoverishment of the 
ordinary Tatars.  The revival of the Crimean nation is associated with Ismail Bey 
Gaspirali, who advocated increased cooperation with the Russians.258  Gaspirali himself 
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was born to a Tatar dvoryanstvo (nobility) family and was educated in a local Islamic 
school, and then in Russia and France.259  He recognized the threat of Russification, and 
sought to counter it through a revival of Islamic education that would not directly 
challenge Russia’s political authority.  Gaspirali published a book titled Russkoe 
Musul’manstvo (Russian Islam) in 1881, and in 1883 a journal Tercuman-Pepevodchic 
(Translator), promoting the modernization of Russian Islam; his audience was the youth, 
because the old elite had left Crimea and the clergy was under complete Russian 
control.260  The youth, influenced by the ideas of Gaspirali, split into three schools — his 
followers, the Young Tatars and the Tatar nationalists (Vatan) — each of which 
contributed to the emergence of a broad nationalist movement among the Crimean 
Tatars.261  Gaspirali’s nationalistic movement reduced Crimean Tatar emigration and 
changed their perception of their identity from that of a “religiously defined” community 
to one whose only homeland was Crimea.262 
3. Changes in Crimean Demographics Under the Soviet Union 
With the collapse of the Tsarist regime in February 1917, the Crimean Tatar 
nationalistic movements tried to establish a cultural autonomy. The Crimean Tatar 
political movement, the Milli Firka263 (the National Party), became the dominant force, 
and the self-proclaimed Tatar state of Crimea was established in December 1917, and 
was almost immediately crushed by the Bolsheviks, who feared Crimea’s secession.264  
During the Civil War, power over the peninsula was volatile.  In the late 1920s, the 
Bolsheviks took Crimea under firm control with the goal of incorporating it into the  
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communist state.  On October 18, 1921, Communists allowed the establishment of the 
Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.  At that time the Crimean Tatars 
constituted 25 percent of the total Crimean population.265 
However, this did not mean the establishment of national autonomy.  National 
autonomies and nationalism were beyond the scope of what was allowed by the Soviet 
power.  It recognized regional autonomies only and nationalism was considered a 
bourgeois trait.266  The Crimean Tatars made a counterargument, claiming that autonomy 
can not exist without nationality.267   
Soviet policy in Crimea was, at least, twofold.  On one side, Vladimir Lenin 
introduced the policy of korenizatsia,268 which consisted of supporting “the development 
of the Crimean Tatar language…increasing the national intelligentsia 
and…institutionalizing ethnicity in the Crimean state apparatus; Crimean Tatar history 
was taught in Ak Mecit (the name for old Tatar village in place of Simferopol) university, 
Crimean Tatar ethnographic museums were opened, the Crimean Tatar language became 
the official language along with Russian in Crimea and the Crimean Tatars filled from 30 
to 60 percent of the positions in Soviet and Party organizations, while constituting 25 
percent of the total Crimean population.”269 
On the other hand, Lenin claimed Crimea was a hive of bourgeoisie, and sent the 
Cheka (Soviet secret police) to deal with those who opposed the Soviet rule.  Crimea had 
been a last refuge for opponents of the communist regime.  As the result, sixty thousand 
members of Milli Firka (who were concerned “with the [quality of] life of the Tatars”) 
and other organizations perished by April 1921 during six months of Cheka’s ‘work.’270  
Soviet land reform and collectivization led to famines in some areas of the former USSR.   
 
                                                 
265 Williams, The Crimean Tatars, 335. 
266 Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, 131-132. 
267 Williams, The Crimean Tatars, 335. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, 132. 
 57
Crimea was not an exception.  The famines of 1921-22 and 1931-33 and the Communist 
repressive policy resulted in one hundred fifty thousand Crimean Tatars being “killed or 
forced to leave the Crimea.”271  
Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin’s policy was directed to “decimate the 
national Communist cadres of the various republics and smaller territories throughout the 
USSR.”272 In Crimea this meant the elimination of national scientific, pedagogical, 
Crimean Tatar party and state elites, Russification of the Crimean Tatar culture (the Latin 
alphabet was replaced by Cyrillic, Russian words and grammatical rules were 
introduced), and closely connecting the Crimean ASSR to the RSFSR.273  The 
demographic impact of these policies was palpable.  In 1923 Crimean Tatars constituted 
24.07 percent of the Crimean population; in 1939 it had been 19.37 percent.274   
World War II changed Crimean demographics significantly.  After the Nazis 
invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin ordered the deportation of peoples and nationalities 
associated with Hitler and his allies.  The latter, in Stalin’s view, increasingly came to 
include anyone who had survived Nazi occupation, or failed to die fighting the Germans.  
Thus, the Soviet Army retook Crimea in 1944, and 188,626 Crimea Tatars are estimated 
to have been deported on suspicion of having bought their survival by collaborating with 
the Germans.275 
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C. SURGUN276 AND THE RETURN FROM EXILE: CHALLENGES AND 
CONSEQUENCES  
1. Why the Crimean Tatars Were Resettled 
The precedent for the forceful resettlement of the Crimean Tatars was created by 
the Russian Empire.  After the Crimean War of 1854-54, the Crimean Tatars were 
accused of collaborating with the Turko-Anglo-French alliance which resulted in official 
encouragement of their emigration from Crimea.277  The same accusation was made 
during the WWII toward them.  It was true to a certain extent.  Many of the Crimean 
Tatars expressed sympathy for Germans as their liberators.  Germany persuaded some 
Crimean Tatars, both prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians, to serve for Germany and, 
“by February 1942, the Germans had outfitted 1,632 Crimean Tatars into 14 companies 
and six battalions.”278  During the course of WWII, twenty thousand Crimean Tatars 
fought for the Wehrmacht (almost 10 percent of the 1939 Crimean Tatar population).279   
The Crimean Tatars were not the only minority who fought for the Germans in 
WWII.  “The Volga Tatars contributed between 35,000 and 40,000 volunteers; from the 
various Caucasian peoples over 110,000 were recruited, and the Kalmyks provided about 
5,000 volunteers.”280  The number of collaborators among Russians, Ukrainians, and 
other Slavic nations is not clear, but in relative terms almost certainly as high. 
On the other hand, twenty thousand (some other sources propose fifty 
thousand281) Crimean Tatars were conscripted to the Soviet Army and 630 Crimean 
Tatars out of a total of 3,783 took part in anti-Nazi fight as partisans.282  Many of the 
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Tatars supported the partisans logistically and by providing intelligence.  This support 
generated heavy reprisals from the Germans.  Thousands of the Crimean Tatars were 
killed, fifteen thousand were taken to Germany and Austria, and 115 Crimean villages 
were burned to the ground.283   
There were several reasons behind Stalin’s decision to deport the Crimean Tatars: 
the obvious one — their betrayal in flavor of the Nazis — and some the other reasons that 
were hidden by Soviet officials.  Among them are extensive ties between the Soviet 
Crimean Tatars and various Crimean Tatar Diasporas in the wake of a planned Soviet 
invasion into Turkey, and inflated statistics of Crimean Tatar betrayal.284 The Crimean 
Tatar’s alleged betrayal, and their supposed attempts to exterminate the non-Tatar 
population in Crimea were widely advertised by the Soviet officials both among the 
troops and civilians all over the Soviet Union.285 
In addition, ties between the Crimean Tatars and the Diaspora had not received 
proper scholarly attention. These were viewed as a threat to the extension of Soviet 
influence after the war. Crimean Tatars who had maintained relations with the Diaspora 
in Turkey and other states undermined the strategic value of Crimea as the ‘unsinkable 
aircraft carrier’ and important naval base for Soviet strategic plans in Turkey and further 
in Mediterranean.  
2. Surgun 
After the Soviet Army entered Crimea, any person accused of collaboration with 
the Nazis by two individuals was executed without trial.286  Less than one week after the 
Nazis left Crimea, on May 18, 1944, Stalin ordered the deportation.  Crimean Tatar 
villages were surrounded by Army and NKVD units in the middle of the night.  The 
Tatars were given less than one hour to collect their most valuable belongings.  Then,  
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they boarded trucks to be transported to railway hubs throughout Crimea. Complete 
deportation of 188,626 Crimean Tatars, primarily to Uzbekistan, was finished in just 
three days.  
Crimean Tatars who fought in the Soviet Army were demobilized after the fall of 
Berlin and sent to exile.  According to Otto J. Pohl, “in March 1949, the special 
settlements contained 8,995 Crimean Tatar veterans of the Red Army including 534 
officers and 1,392 sergeants.  The special settlement also held 742 Crimean Tatar 
Communist Party members and 1,225 Komsomoists [members (Young Communist 
League)].”287   
The estimates of the amount of death during several weeks of horrible 
transportation revolve around five percent (seventy-nine hundred).288  The Crimean 
Tatars were not well suited to the climate in Uzbekistan.  One of the deportees recalled 
that upon his arrival to Uzbekistan “it was about 110 degrees Fahrenheit — unimaginable 
heat [for the Crimea].”289  Estimates of those who lost their lives as the result of 
deportation vary from 45,000 to 110,000.290   
3. The Struggle for Return 
Conditions improved slightly for Crimean Tatars after Stalin’s’ death in 1953.  
Some special settlement restrictions were lifted first for the partisans, military veterans, 
and, later in 1956, the unpublished decree removed restrictions from the entire 
Diaspora.291  However, several core limitations remained: they were not authorized to 
return to Crimea and the right to their property was not restored.292  The Crimean Tatars 
and two other nationalities — Meskhetian Turks and Volga Germans — were deprived of 
complete rehabilitation.   
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By the late 1950s, the Crimean Tatars were trying to gain attention to their rights 
to return to Crimea.  In this effort they collected twenty-five thousand signatures on a 
petition to the Communist Party Congress of 1961, claiming a full restoration of their 
rights.293  “The petitions became one of the principle instruments in the Crimean Tatar 
national movement in the 1950s, 60s and 70s.”294  The Soviet regime responded with a 
series of trials for anti-Soviet propaganda, “arresting and giving lengthy jail terms.”295   
Crimean Tatar efforts to return from exile attracted the attention of Soviet 
dissidents, and, later on, of an international community.296  Famous Soviet dissident 
Andrei Sakharov appealed to the UN for support in the Crimean Tatar struggle for return 
to their homeland; later, he asked French President Giscard d’Estaing, who was planning 
to visit the USSR, to raise the question of the Crimean Tatars.297 Mustafa Gemilev, the 
current Kurultai leader, who was jailed in 1966, was freed in 1988, in part with the 
assistance of U.S. President Reagan.298 
The situation changed radically during only the last years of the existence of the 
Soviet Union.  First, ethnic conflict in Uzbekistan showed that outsiders are not 
welcomed there. Second, “the Supreme Soviet issued a decree “on Recognizing the 
Illegal and Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement and 
Ensuring their Rights”299 on November 14, 1989 following a demonstration by Crimean 
Tatars in Red Square in Moscow.  As a result, the Crimean Tatars started moving closer 
to Crimea and, by 1989, more than thirty-eight thousand Crimean Tatars lived in 
Crimea.300  Out of an estimated five hundred thousand Crimean Tatars that lived in 
Central Asia and Siberia, two hundred sixty thousand had returned to Crimea by 1993.301  
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D. CHALLENGES AND CONSEQUENCES 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine experienced political 
conflicts of multiple dimensions.  There were internal disputes between Kiev and 
Simferopol and external ones between Russia and Ukraine.  The returning Crimean 
Tatars added an additional dimension to an existing set of problems in economic, social, 
and political life.   
Crimean Tatar arrival to the peninsula exacerbated an already serious economic 
crisis there, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. The economy of 
Ukraine suffered as well, but it continued to subsidize Crimea.  The arrival of thousands 
of impoverished Crimean Tatars became a challenge for Ukraine, whose economy was 
being ruined by hyperinflation.  
Socially, the influx of new people to the region increased competition for jobs.302  
Social tensions also increased as Crimean Tatars tried to reclaim their confiscated 
property and other rights they had lost due to the deportation.  The arrival of the Muslims, 
bearers of the relatively rare religion at the peninsula,303 made people anxious due to the 
stereotype of Tatars, as barbarians who had lived by banditry and the slave trade in earlier 
times. The second Kurultai (the first took part in 1918) convened in September 1990 
passing the “Declaration on National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People;” the 
declaration described Crimea as “the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on 
which they alone possess the right to self government” and asserted that “the political, 
economic, spiritual and cultural rebirth of the Crimean Tatar people is only possible in 
their own sovereign national state.”304 
The presence of the Crimean Tatars deepened the crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine.  Russia feared that, through the Tatars, Turkey might get deeper into Ukrainian 
affairs and reduce Russian influence.  In addition, increased tensions between Slavs and 
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Tatars provide another reason for Moscow to put pressure on the Ukrainian government 
to protect ethnic Russians — a dynamic that has persisted, with varying intensity, to this 
day. 
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V. THE RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET IN UKRAINE  
The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine intersects with the 
problems posed by the Crimean Tatars in several respects.  It is itself an independent 
source of friction between Russia and Ukraine, and to that extent makes cooperation on 
other matters of common interest more difficult.  Beyond that, its presence is widely 
thought to influence the outlook of the Crimean Tatars directly, but in diverging ways.  
Some argue that the presence of the BSF helps deter the Crimean Tatars from claiming 
independence from Ukraine, or initiating intrastate ethnic conflict.  Others argue that the 
fleet fuels pro-Russian sentiments among the Crimean Russophones, who wish to 
challenge Ukrainian authority over the Crimean peninsula, and are generally hostile to 
Tatar interests. 
A. A HISTORY OF A CONFLICT OVER THE BLACK SEA FLEET  
1. Soviet Black Sea Fleet 
The Soviet Navy (Voenno-Morskoi Flot) consisted of four fleets.  The Black Sea 
Fleet was the third largest, and constituted of “26 percent of the former Soviet Navy ships 
and 7 percent of its submarines, primarily based in Ukrainian ports of Sevastopol and 
Odessa, with smaller bases in Poti, Georgia, and Novorossiysk, Russia.”305  Its main task 
was (and still is) to defend the Black Sea coast and compete with the U.S. sixth fleet and 
other NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean.306  The BSF had more than four hundred 
combat aircraft and one hundred helicopters, supported by significant land components, 
including a Coastal Defense Division with three hundred tanks and six hundred armored 
vehicles and a Naval Infantry Brigade.307   
At the time of the Soviet collapse, BSF maintenance and basing facilities 
constituted a valuable piece of former Soviet infrastructure for Ukraine and Russia to 
compete over.  Some Western observers feared that such competition might be serious 
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enough to escalate to an armed conflict.308  In Russian-Ukrainian relations the issues of 
Crimea, Sevastopol, and the BSF were the most important obstacles on the way to 
signing an interstate treaty.309 
2. Russian and Ukrainian Perception of the Black Sea Fleet 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia tried to establish control over 
the military formations, based on the territory of NIS, which it considered as strategic 
assets necessary for the joint defense of the Commonwealth of Independent states 
(CIS).310 Ukraine did not consider the BSF to be of strategic significance in this sense.  
Its leadership regarded the BSF as a conventional military asset to be nationalized along 
with other military hardware stationed in Ukraine at the moment of the Soviet Union’s 
disappearance.311   
The issue of the BSF was also used as a cover for higher interests at stake.  For 
Russia, the interest was chiefly the establishment of a “long-term presence and influence 
on the Black Sea;” for Ukraine it was about “the viability of Ukrainian sovereignty over 
Crimea.”312  For the both, the real interest was about influencing unstable domestic 
politics and domestic interest groups, rather than about confronting external threats.313  
Russian interest was not in the ships, but in preserving its traditional presence in Crimea 
                                                 
308 Tyler Felgenhauer, Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University, 1999), 1, https://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/ukraine.pdf (accessed February 7, 2008); 
and RusNavy.com, “Russia and Ukraine have measured swords with one another twice,” 
http://rusnavy.com/nowadays/concept/rusvsukr1.htm (accessed February 7, 2008). 
309 D’Anieri et al., Politics and Society in Ukraine; Maria Drohobycky, ed., Crimea: Dynamics, 
Challenges, and Prospects (Lanham, MD; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995); Andrew Cottey et 
al., New Security Challenges in Post Communist Europe (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 
2002); Garnett, Keystone in the Arch; Alexey Arbatov et al., ed., Russia and the West: the 21st Century 
Security Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Kremenyuk, Conflicts in and Around Russia; 
Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy; Lieven, Ukraine & Russia; Kurt R. Spillmann, ed., Between Russia and 
the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine (Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 
Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1999); Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia; and Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. 
Brelauer, ed., Russia in the New Century: Stability and Disorder (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). 
310 Zaborsky, “Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet,” 25. 
311 Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, 109. 
312 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 74. 
313 Felgenhauer, Ukraine, Russia, 1-2. 
 67
through claiming sovereign status of Sevastopol, the main base for the BSF.314 Russia 
wanted to keep Turkey, its ancient rival, away from Ukraine, and prevent active Turkish 
involvement in Crimea, especially with regard to Crimean Tatars.315  Russia also desired 
to reinstall its patronage and control over the former Soviet Republics, the so-called ‘near 
abroad.’  Vladimir Putin’s government in particular has focused on subordination of 
“former Soviet space” in the interest of Russian security, and has been less concerned 
with troublesome and expensive patronage.316   
For Ukraine, the issue of the Black Sea Fleet was important for proving its 
independence, and showing that it could not easily be intimidated.  It was not a matter of 
military importance, because Ukraine is not able to sustain a large blue-water navy or 
even a piece of it.317  Possessing a part of the BSF would also strengthen Ukraine’s de-
facto rights for the Crimean peninsula, however, which is a political consideration in its 
own right. 
3. Background for the Dispute of Black Sea Fleet Accords 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine were close to a 
military conflict over the status of Crimea and Sevastopol, and the ownership of the 
former Soviet BSF and everything associated with it.  The situation was exacerbated by 
the nationalistic hard-liners within Ukrainian and Russian governments.  The BSF 
negotiations were about the division of hardware into two fleets — Russian and 
Ukrainian — basing rights for Russia in Crimea, and, generally speaking about the right 
to control Crimea and Sevastopol.  
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The issue of basing rights was especially important and complicated.  In the early 
1990s, Russia did not have any significant naval infrastructure on the Black Sea beyond 
Ukraine. Russia has since undertaken a massive program of building the necessary 
infrastructure in Novorossiysk (to be completed in 2012) and has negotiated with Syria to 
increase basing rights there.  In the meantime, Russia’s deteriorating economy denied it 
the capacity to either build a substitute for the current infrastructure or to relocate BSF 
personnel from Ukraine somewhere else.318  
The most important point of the dispute was about control over the Crimean 
peninsula and Sevastopol.  “In many ways, it is really about the Crimean Peninsula itself, 
which [was then] poised for a referendum on its independence from Ukraine, and about 
Sevastopol, a navy town of faded elegance that dates to the reign of Catherine the 
Great.”319  Ukraine inherited part of the Soviet Army without considerable resistance of 
Russia, but division of the BSF was closely connected to the rights for Crimea and 
Sevastopol.  Russia’s claim on Sevastopol and Crimea was supported by the ethnic 
Russian majority and other Russified nationalities, and reinforced by the pro-Russian 
administration of Crimea. 
4. Black Sea Fleet Accords 
The dispute started on March 16, 1992 with the creation of the Russian defense 
ministry and a responding decree by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to form a 
Ukrainian Navy in April 1992.320  The “war of decrees”321 over the ownership of the 
BSF resulted in multiple Russian-Ukrainian summits and other meetings over how to 
divide the fleet.  In the end both sides agreed “that the Black Sea Fleet was inherited by 
both Ukraine and Russia.”322   
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Despite the moratorium to undertake any unilateral actions reached during several 
rounds of talks, two incidents derailed further negotiations.323  First, Ukraine announced 
that 97 percent of BSF officers had taken an oath of loyalty to it, claiming right of 
ownership over BSF facilities, followed by seizing a naval garrison in Sevastopol.  
Second, a BSF ship hoisted a Ukrainian flag and “defected” to Odessa during a naval 
exercise.  Ukrainian authorities claimed ownership of the ship against Russian 
accusations of ‘piracy.’  A similar case, but from the Russian side, emerged in May 1994 
when Russia seized a research ship in the Ukrainian mainland port of Odessa and placed 
it under its control. 
Propositions for the division of the BSF ranged from full subordination to Russia 
to equal 50-50 division between Russia and Ukraine.  Russia emphasized the strategic 
character of a fleet armed with nuclear weapons, but it was not clear how many ships 
were actually able to carry nuclear weapons, nor where these weapons (if any) were 
stored, on the ships or at the fleet’s bases.324  Ukraine’s claims were purely territorial. Up 
until 1995 the issues of the division of the BSF remained unresolved mostly because of 
the status of Sevastopol and basing rights for Russia. 
In 1995-96, Ukraine received one hundred fifty naval installations in addition to 
“Mykolaiv, Saki, Ochakov and Danubian flotilla bases outside Crimea,” and twenty ships 
and some aircrafts, based on naval bases, military garrisons and airports.325  Again, the 
division of the BSF stopped in 1996 after Ukraine did not provide sufficient basing rights 
in Sevastopol to Russia.   
Support by Crimean authorities for secession to Russia reinforced the Russian 
bargaining position over Sevastopol and Crimea.  Russia demanded “a 99-year lease of 
the city of Sevastopol (and not just the port), a division of the coastal infrastructure (as 
well as vessels) and removal of all Ukrainian naval forces from the Crimea (a demand 
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backed by then Crimean President Meshkov).”326  Local support for Russia in Sevastopol 
ranged for up to 89 percent, and the majority of Sevastopol city council declared that 
legally the Crimea was part of the Russian territory.327  These influences were 
counterbalanced by the Union of Ukrainian Officers, Rukh, Congress of Ukrainian 
Nationalists and Crimean Tatars (the latter advocated territorial integrity of Ukraine).   
Finally, after almost five years of disagreement, on May 28, 1997, Moscow and 
Kiev finally settled their dispute over the Black Sea Fleet.  The two sides decided to 
divide the BSF property and that Russia would lease Sevastopol facilities for the BSF. 
Russia and Ukraine split the ships 50-50, with Russia then buying a part of Ukraine’s 
share.  
The two states agreed that Russia would rent three ports for warships and two 
airfields for a twenty-year period. Russia also agreed to station “no more than 25,000 
military personnel at the bases, and that it would not place any nuclear weapons at the 
leased facilities.”328  On March 24, 1999, the Parliament of Ukraine ratified the three 
intergovernmental agreements signed in May 1997.  Currently, the BSF consists of “some 
80 vessels and 15,000 servicemen in Ukraine.”329 
5. Current Disputes Between Ukraine and Russia Over the BSF 
Current disputes revolve around the timely withdrawal of the BSF in 2017 
according to the agreements, leasing cost and multiple violations by the Russian side of 
the accords on the division of the BSF between Ukraine and Russia.330  The first is 
mainly about Ukraine’s concerns that the RBSF will stay in Crimea after 2017.  There is 
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much evidence to support this concern.  First, Russian Naval planning out to the year 
2020 considers Sevastopol as the main base for the BSF.331  Russian officials at different 
levels proclaim that the BSF will continue to stay in Crimea after 2017.  At the same 
time, Russia has accelerated building a naval base in Novorossiysk and is investigating 
basing a part of the RBSF in Syria.332  Second, Ukraine consider the cost of lease, 
negotiated at $97.75 million, to be inappropriate given that Ukraine must now pay close 
to the world market price for Russian natural gas.. Finally, Ukraine considers Russia as 
the violator of the accords because it has occupied more facilities and land in Crimea than 
was earlier agreed, a charge Russia rejects.333 
B. THE RBSF IN CRIMEA: REAL AND IMAGINABLE ROLES 
1. The Negative Role of the RBSF in Crimea 
Russia today is a revisionist state, eager to reshuffle its cards in Crimea.  The 
RBSF is a perfect tool for this purpose.  “Russia still considers military force to be an 
element in its foreign policy towards CIS…which Moscow has declared to be a zone of 
its vital interests.”334  The RBSF in Crimea allows Russia to conduct its intelligence 
gathering and PSYOPS in Ukraine and Crimea at a lower cost than from the mainland. 
To conduct intelligence at least three tools — maritime and coastal SIGINT units, air 
platforms, and scouts — are available in Crimea.  The RBSF has maritime and coastal 
signal intelligence (SIGINT) units, incorporating a wide array of ‘legalized’ ways and 
means to conduct intelligence gathering in Ukraine beyond Crimea.  Organized PSYOPS 
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started in 1992 with the establishment of PSYOPS units within the BSF, and have 
assisted in the creation of a “social base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol” 
and in support of pro-Russian organizations in Crimea.335  The Russian government has 
invested in the creation of a civilian infrastructure and media in Sevastopol and Crimea to 
promote Russian ideas.  
The RBSF widely participates in illegal business activities in Crimea.  It sub-
leases facilities, without Ukraine’s consent, to businesses that are consequently able to 
evade local taxes.336  The RBSF leases radio frequencies within the range allocated to it 
for military purposes; besides the lost commercial profit by Ukraine, this undermines the 
safe use of military equipment by the RBSF itself.337   
Crimea may also turn into a target for terrorist revenge by Chechen guerrillas.  
RBSF training centers in Crimea were used by troops departing to Chechnya.  Individuals 
and RBSF military units participate in counterterrorism efforts in North Caucasus 
(mainly Chechnya).  A Marine scout troop (detached) participated there in 1999-2000 as 
part of joint Northern Fleet Marine battalion and is currently stationed in Crimea.338  
Sevastopol and, to a lesser extent, Crimea are rich for terrorist targets (barracks, families, 
arsenals and depots).  The most dangerous is the IR-200 nuclear reactor of the Sevastopol 
nuclear institute,339 which might serve as a ‘dirty bomb.’  Those threats seem to be 
plausible in the wake of increased Wahhabist activities in Crimea.  
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2. Positive Roles of the RBSF in Crimea and Implications Derived from 
These Roles 
The Russian budget provides some financial support to Sevastopol.  However, 
this support does not arrive on a regular basis.340  The RBSF also hires local inhabitants 
to work for it.  The government of Moscow also provides financial support to Sevastopol.   
Moscow is devoting particular attention, Luzhkov [Moscow mayor] note, 
to the task of patronaging the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which is based at 
Sevastopol. Much was done during the past few years to “create normal 
conditions for the fleet's work.” The “Moskva” missile cruiser was 
commissioned on money from the Moscow city budget. More than 2,500 
flats were built in Sevastopol for the families of sailors, along with a 
school building, kindergarten, and medical center. A subsidiary of 
Moscow State University is functioning and developing there for the 
second year running.341   
Russia also believes the presence of its fleet at Sevastopol contributes to regional 
stability.  “If we surrender the Crimea, it is not to Ukraine but to Turkey, Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, is reported to have 
said.”342  This point of view is quite exaggerated. Turkey does not need the Crimean 
peninsula to control the Black Sea.  The Bosporus and Dardanelles provide exceptional 
control over the maritime lines between the Black and Mediterranean Seas.   
Some Russian sources also hypothesizes that the RBSF is a deterrent to keep 
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar nationalists from putting additional pressure on the 
                                                 
340 BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Sevastopol to Become Ukraine's “Unifying Chain” with 
Russia – Governor,” July 15, 2005, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T3047015157&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T3047015160&cisb=22_T3047015159&tr
eeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=1 (accessed February 14, 2008). 
341 BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Moscow city delegation visits Crimea,” July 15, 2005, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T3035824658&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T3035824662&cisb=22_T3035824661&tr
eeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8063&docNo=13 (accessed February 14, 2008). 
342 Sergei Blagov, “Politics-Russia: Skepticism Prevails Over Friendship Treaty,” IPS-Inter Press 
Service, February 25, 2000, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do 
(accessed February 14, 2008). 
 74
Russian-speaking community in Crimea.343  This point has very limited grounds. Many 
ethnic Russians live without problems in Western Ukraine without any support from the 
RBSF.   
A more extreme prediction was made by some Crimean Tatars and Krymchacs 
(which is surprising).  The Deputy Head of the Krymchacs cultural society, Mark Purim, 
made a statement that 2017 will be the year of creation of the Crimean Tatar state.  
Nariman Abdul’vaapov, a Crimean State Engineer-Pedagogical University faculty 
member, supported this claim during a seminar on “Protection and Preservation of 
Indigenous Crimean Peoples Cultural Heritage.”344  However, official Mejelis leadership 
supports the idea of territorial integrity of Ukraine.345  Does the RBSF serve as the 
deterrent against such undesirable consequences for Ukraine?   
The RBSF consist of about fifteen thousand men and eighty ships (twenty-plus 
warships only).  Despite the impressive number, these personnel are not well suited for 
antiterrorist and riot control functions.  According to Jane’s, the RBSF has a naval 
infantry brigade346 plus the RBSF HQ guards and support battalion.  Naval aviation units 
and possibly other major bases and garrisons may have their integral small units to 
maintaining security of ships, airfields and other installations.  A small detachment of 
combat divers, acquired during division of the Soviet BSF,347 is possibly still with the 
RBSF.   
                                                 




reeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=27 (accessed February 14, 2008). 
344 “2017 goody krymskie tatary namereny dobitsya sozdaniya sobstvennogo gosudarstva,” 
Bserossiiskoe obschestvennoe obedinenie Zubr, September 11, 2007, http://za.zubr.in.ua/2007/09/11/1209/ 
(accessed February 7, 2008). 
345 Ibid. 
346 Jane’s Information Group, “Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Russia and the CIS,” Jane’s 
Navy International, January 3, 2008, 
http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/russs130.htm@cur
rent&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Russian%20black%20sea%20fleet&backPath=http://search.janes.c
om/Search&Prod_Name=CISS& (accessed February 11, 2008). 
347 “Soglashenie Mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi o Parametrah Razdela Chernomorskogo 
Flota,” Sbornik Zakonodatel’stva, May 28, 1997, http://www.vcom.ru/cgi-
bin/db/zakdoc?_reg_number=%D09706092 (accessed February 12, 2008). 
 75
In case of riots caused by the Crimean Tatars’ desire to get independence from 
Ukraine, the RBSF units will be among the first (along with Ukrainian military 
formations) to be attacked by the radicals to gain weapons and explosives. As soon as the 
riots began, the extensive network of big and small RBSF units348 will be involved in 
force protection measures.  Moreover, RBSF personnel are involved in the protection of 
several lighthouses necessary for navigation near the Crimean shores.349  These 
personnel and other small units are among the least protected.  The real ‘boots on the 
ground’ are in the naval infantry brigade, the combat diver detachment, and possibly the 
guard company of the RBSF headquarters.  This is barely enough for their own force 
protection.  Ukraine can not count on the support of the RSBF in dealing with possible 
Crimean Tatar riots; and Russia in turn can not send significant reinforcement without 
Ukraine’s consent.   
Thus, the RBSF cannot serve as the deterrent for the Crimean Tatars.  Like the 
Russian 14th Army in Transdnestria, Moldova, however, the RBSF could arm pro-
Russian paramilitaries — a truly negative and dangerously escalatory role.350  The actual 
RBSF units will be hard-pressed to protect RBSF’s multiple bases, lighthouses, and so 
on.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Ukraine and Russia have gone to considerable lengths to settle disputes over the 
division of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet.  Despite the Agreement reached in 1997, 
the issue still festers.  Basing of the RBSF in Ukraine has raised questions about the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of its presence in Crimea.  From Ukraine’s 
perspective, having the RBSF in Crimea provides an easier environment for Russia to  
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gather intelligence on Ukraine, and to conduct psychological operations against it.  The 
RBSF also participates in some illegal activities, and its presence increases the possibility 
of terrorist acts in Ukraine.  
Conversely, the claim that the RBSF deters the Crimean Tatars from demanding 
independence from Ukraine is hardly plausible, due to the specific nature of the military 
contingents involved, which are themselves an easy target for terrorists.   
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VI. ETHNIC IMBROGLIO IN CRIMEA: A PROBLEM THROUGH 
THE PRISM OF THE THEORY OF AUTONOMY, INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND TERRORISM 
A. A STUDY OF CRIMEA’S AUTONOMY 
According to its Constitution, Ukraine is a unitary state.351  At the same time, it 
has an autonomous republic among its administrative-territorial units (ATU). The 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) has its own constitution, the capital 
(Simferopol), symbols, and fully configured legislature, executive, and judiciary branches 
of government. 352  Ukraine has developed a hierarchical relationship between the state 
governing bodies (the center) and administrative-territorial units (periphery).  Thus, the 
normative power of the ARC is subordinated to the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, 
and may not exceed the regulative limits imposed by state bodies.  The only qualification 
is that the ARC enjoys some “exclusive features,”353 elevating the ARC over the rest of 
the ATUs in Ukraine. 
1. Theoretical Prospective on Autonomy 
There is no agreement among international law scholars and political scientists on 
what can be considered as autonomy and how to conceptualize it.354  Autonomies were 
once regarded as dangerous to a state’s territorial integrity and an initial step for 
secession.  Later, the idea of autonomization was transformed into more state-friendly 
issues to silence claims for secession.  “Autonomy is just seen as one element of state 
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construction addressing the needs of diverse communities.”355 Stefan Wolff and Mark 
Weller see sources of potential tensions and conflicts through the prism of “the 
politicization of ethnicity and territory.”356  They saw ethnic groups as “a type of cultural 
collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, 
and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, 
language, or institutions.”357  Territory was identified as a set of “values in or of it.”358  
Those values may include natural resources, tax income generated by established 
government, or access to geographic, military or strategic advantages offered by the 
territory.  
A group, to be granted autonomy, needs to be distinguished territorially or by 
some other characteristic.  The international legal understanding of sovereignty does not 
require that a state be a single national group. It may comprise a multiplicity of groups, 
supervised and coordinated in their interrelations through a certain set of functions for a 
common interest.359  On the other side, “a legal obligation to grant autonomy is not 
mentioned.”360  It is difficult to imagine all thirty-five hundred of the world’s ethnic 
groups claiming their own states.  
Moreover, International law (IL)  governing the existence of rights independent of 
sovereign usually refers to individual rights,361 but a group of people, unified by certain 
features, may nevertheless have a collective identity and collective rights.  The precedent 
for discussing the collective rights of indigenous peoples emerged in 1957; however, it 
was not beneficial for the ethnic groups in the minority.  The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) issued a Convention on Indigenous Peoples No. 107 assuming “the 
assimilation into the rest of the population of individual members of indigenous groups as 
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they became civilized.”362  In 1989 (entered into force September 5, 1991), the 
indigenous peoples acquired a better position in IL with the issuing of the more 
progressive ILO Convention No. 169363 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries which aimed at the preservation of “the integrity and identity of 
those communities.”364  In 1993, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted a draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous peoples,365 which was later adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
(Ukraine abstained).366 “The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples constitutes 
the minimum standards for their survival, dignity and well-being.”367  The Crimean 
Tatars, Krymchaks and the Karaims in Crimea are in their majority, the citizens of 
Ukraine are equal in rights with the other representatives — citizens of Ukraine — from 
the other ethnic groups.  The Declaration provides (declares) the abundance of rights 
desirable for the indigenous peoples.  The most important one is “the right to the 
restitution of lands confiscated, occupied or otherwise taken without their free and 
informed consent, with the option of providing just and fair compensation wherever such 
return is not possible.”368 The Declaration, however, is not legally binding; it is not a 
                                                 
362 Geoff Gilbert, “Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law,” Cornell 
International Law Journal, (Fall, 2002): 6, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T3078041221&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T3078041227&cisb=22_T3078041226&tr
eeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=12489&docNo=2 (accessed February 16, 2008). 
363 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Convention (No. 169) 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm (accessed February 14, 2008). 
364 Gilbert, “Autonomy and Minority Groups,” 6.  
365 University of Minnesota Human Rights Center, “Study Guide: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/studyguides/indigenous.html (accessed February 16, 2008). 
366 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,” September 14, 2007, http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp (accessed February 16, 2008). 
367 United Nations, “Press Conference on Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Department of 
Public Information - News and Media Division, December 12, 2006, 
http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2006/061212_indigenous.doc.htm (accessed February 16, 2008). 
368 James S. Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment,” the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Jurist forum, October 3, 
2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php(accessed 
February 16, 2008). 
 80
treaty.369  On the claim that the Declaration can not become customary international law 
due to the absence of such practice in the history of states before, James S. Anaya and 
Siegfried Wiessner argue that the shift from assimilation of the indigenous peoples to the 
preservation of their identity370 is already a global practice and consensus.371  
Minorities are not automatically granted the right of autonomy.372  Self-
determination is “a right of peoples under colonial and alien domination.”373  Nobody in 
Crimea is under colonial rule or alien domination.  Article 31 of the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous peoples equates autonomy and self-government to the right for self-
determination.  “Indigenous peoples assert that they should not be treated as minorities, 
that they are a discrete group entity within international law.”374  The distinction is 
important, because minorities enjoy protection, in many cases symbolic, by their kin-
states,375 but the indigenous peoples do not have them.  In the case of Crimea, the 
Crimean Tatars are historically closer to being indigenous peoples that the Russians, who 
are an ethnic minority in Ukraine, but a majority in Crimea.   
“Autonomy is always the balance to be found between territorial States…and the 
legitimate (emphasis added) expressions of national or cultural identity.”376  “Autonomy 
is a strategy of preventing and settling ethnic conflict, thus, is based on recognition of 
group-specific concerns alongside or on par with concerns of individuals (independent of 
their ethnic identity) and the state.”377  Autonomy is the state’s internal matter, but, in 
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some cases, it can be agreed internationally, or can be promoted by a kin-state.  For 
instance, Russian law on co-nationals abroad identify state assistance to co-nationals 
abroad to create national-cultural autonomies based on principles and norms of IL.378  
This law, however, offers benefits only on Russian territory; treatment of the Russian 
ethnic minority in Ukraine depends on Ukrainian sovereign decisions.  Autonomy is not 
static, and there are conditions in which it creates the possibility for political instability, 
as it has done, for instance, in Kosovo. 
Hans-Joachim Heintze provides the legal understanding of types of 
autonomies.379  Territorial autonomy provides group protection to a dominating minority 
within a geographically well-defined territory.  It creates, however, other minorities 
within newly established territorial autonomy. “The minorities in the same area will be 
concerned with their future which serves as the source for perpetuation of a conflict.”380  
To avoid possible mistreatment, plain and accurate agreements on territorial autonomy 
should be used between parties concerned.  Non-territorial autonomy might be a 
workable solution in cases when the chances to win territorial autonomy are weak.  
“Non-territorial autonomy is good for non-compact settlement of ethnic group (caused 
either by history or contemporary developments).”381 There are several types, however 
overlapping, of non-territorial autonomy: cultural, personal and functional.  Cultural 
autonomy allows freedom in cultural affairs.  It allows regulating education, culture, art, 
sport and youth affairs of a minority.  Personal autonomy is applicable when minority 
groups are not settled in a compact way sufficient to establish territorial minority.  In 
such conditions, certain preferential treatment is necessary for those minorities, e.g. 
voting benefits to guarantee representation for a minority in governing institutions. For 
instance, in the Ottoman Empire the millet system allowed non-Muslims to “enjoy some 
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degree of cultural and religious autonomy.”382  Functional autonomy affords control of 
cultural, media, educational and religious affairs in order to promote a group’s identity.  
The difference is that a group needs to be organized collectively to exercise such 
functions without state interference.  State public law, authorizing the transfer of the 
responsibility for these issues from a state to a public entity, is highly desirable. 
In sum, IL provides various forms of autonomy arrangements for conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution.  With the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous peoples in 2007, the limitation of IL to the protection of an individual’s rights 
shifted toward the more formal recognition of collective rights.  The status of indigenous 
peoples is, in some aspects, higher than those of a minority, but if the indigenous peoples 
constitute less than half of the population, they may enjoy the status of a minority.   
2. Problems in the Application of the Theory of Autonomy to Crimea 
The Crimean Tatars demand to be recognized as the indigenous people of the 
Crimean Peninsula.  Along with them, two tiny ethnos, the Karaims (about 1,400) and 
Krymchaks (520),383 also pretend to be indigenous peoples.  None of the three have kin-
states.  The other distinguishable ethnos of the region, Greeks, Armenians and Germans, 
arrived on the Crimean peninsula before them, and do have kin-states.  The Crimean 
Tatars are the third largest ethnic group in Crimea; the others, are significantly smaller,384 
and are losing their voice behind the Crimean Tatars’ claim for expanded rights in the 
peninsula. 
The Crimean peninsula is claimed to be a geographically separate territory, which 
is not completely true.  It is connected to Ukraine territorially, and easily accessible 
through the Strait of Kerch.  None of the national groups mentioned above live in 
compact areas larger than a village.   
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3. The Theory on Terrorism and the Crimean Tatars 
Without a discussion of the theory of terrorism the study of the ‘triangle of 
conflict’ will not be complete.  Crimea has lately experienced a sharp increase in the 
influx of Wahhabi messengers, and has become an attractive place for Islamic radicals. 
Persistent rumors float around about Crimea as a resting place for Chechen guerillas.  It 
has also been hypothesized that the Crimean Tatars send their representatives in support 
for the Chechens.  Apart from the sizeable Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Turkey, where 
terrorist recruitment is known to have occurred, on the strength of the participation of 
Turks in the conflicts in Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there are also ten thousand 
Crimean Tatars with Ukrainian citizenship in Uzbekistan, where terrorism is far more 
widespread than in Ukraine.385 Martha Crenshaw, in “The Logic of Terrorism,” 
identified four groups of causes for terrorism: individual, systemic, rational and 
ideological.386  For the Crimean Tatars individual causes are nationalism, victimization 
(in the Soviet period most especially)387 and occupation of the historic homeland388 by 
outsiders perceived as colonists.  Systemic causes correspond to the Crimean Tatars’ 
long history as indigenous people in the Crimean peninsula, their ostensibly lost 
statehood (the Crimean Khanate and successful autonomy in early Soviet Union), their 
linguistic distinctiveness, and the absence of a kin-state per se which can assist in 
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lobbying minority’s interests internationally. On a rational level, terrorism may be 
chosen as a plausible weapon against a vulnerable government, against which non-violent 
efforts have failed. Ideological causes arise mainly from the practice of a distinct 
religion, aggravated by Wahhabi indoctrination that the government is unable to 
suppress.   
4. Ukraine’s Efforts to Prevent Ethnic-based Tensions in Crimea 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union created an unprecedented set of new legal 
issues.  The troubling moment was in “the emergence of distinct ethnic populations that 
found themselves isolated within the boundaries of a nation with which they share no 
ethnic identity.”389  For the Crimean Tatars it turned into a double challenge: they were 
aliens in both Uzbekistan390 and Ukraine.   
Crimea is home to more than 125 nationalities and ethnic groups, of which only 
20 constitute 0.1 percent and more share of the population.391  Between 1989 and 2001 
the share of ethnic Russians, the majority in Crimea, decreased from 65.6% to 58.5%; the 
share of Ukrainians decreased from 26.7% to 24.4%; and the share of the Crimean Tatars, 
the third largest group, increased from 1.9% to 12.1%, a very rapid increase even if the 
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The vast majority of ethnic-based disputes are encountered between ethnic 
Russians (the shrinking majority) and the Crimean Tatars (a rapidly increasing minority 
with a strongly held belief in its moral claim to primacy based upon its status as an 
indigenous people).392 
a. Citizenship and Other Rights, Depending on Citizenship 
In 1991 Ukraine adopted a new law “On the Citizenship of Ukraine,”393  
under which anyone in Ukraine (as of November 13, 1991) who was not a citizen of 
another state was given Ukrainian citizenship.  Many Crimean Tatars arrived after this 
date.  As a result, they were not granted citizenship in Ukraine. Moreover, in 1992 they 
were granted citizenship of Uzbekistan automatically.  Ukraine does not accept dual 
citizenship and it was costly and time consuming to terminate the Uzbek citizenship.  
According to Ukrainian legislation, non-citizens are excluded from the right to privatize 
land394 besides other rights (to vote, etc.).  To help in solving this problem, the 
governments of Ukraine and Uzbekistan signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Dual 
Citizenship in August 1998, simplifying renunciation of the Uzbek citizenship rights and 
acquiring Ukrainian citizenship.395  Further improvements for the citizenship law of 1997 
and January 18, 2001 made the procedure of acquiring Ukrainian citizenship easier for 
the first and second degree descendants of those forcibly removed by Stalin’s 
administration.396   
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Crimean Tatars were well represented in the administrative bodies of the 
ARC.  In 1994, the Crimean Tatars were granted fourteen seats in the Crimean parliament 
to compensate for the fact that the scattered character of Crimean Tatar settlements in 
Crimea did not allow them to create a majority in any electoral district.397  On the local 
level, the Crimean Tatars had 923 representatives, exactly 14 percent of all available 
seats in the local communities.  In Sevastopol, a stronghold of anti-Tatar sentiment, a 
Crimean Tatar took a post of Deputy Head of State District administration.398  The 
Crimean Committee for Nationalities and Former Deportees was also established in the 
Crimean administration.399  As of February 2008, the leader of the Tatar Mejelis, 
Mustafa Jemilev, is a member of the Ukrainian Committee on Human Rights, National 
Minorities and International Relations which is comprised of ten members and is 
established in the Parliament of Ukraine, and the head of a sub-committee on indigenous 
peoples, national minorities, ethnic groups, deported peoples and national minorities.400  
After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Crimea assembly has eight Crimean Tatar 
members (8 percent), acquired by the Rukh quota.   
The level of representation of Crimean Tatars in public service remains 
low according to the UN “Draft Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.”401  The Crimean Tatars are underrepresented in 
Crimea’s government (1.5 percent as of December 1999), in the Office of Public  
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Prosecutor (5.9 percent), the courts (1.7 percent) and police and security forces (1.3 
percent).402  On the other hand, the Crimean Tatars occupy quite important positions in 
Crimea to influence the situation.403   
c. Ethnic Identity 
The Constitution of Ukraine and the Constitution of the ARC contain 
provisions to support the development of the ethnic identity of nationalities in Ukraine.  
In reality, however, the situation is more complicated.  In Crimea, the majority of schools 
are Russian.  Even the Crimean Tatars have more schools in the Crimean Tatar language 
then Ukrainians, the titular nation in Ukraine.404 
In most cases the ARC supports the autonomy of Russians, but not of 
other nationalities in Crimea.  The Constitution of the ARC (Article 10) identifies 
Russian as the language of the majority of population.405  The Crimean Tatar language is 
also accepted as a language of communication, though to a much lesser extent than 
Russian.406  
Crimean Tatars fear assimilation by the Russians not Ukrainians: 10 
percent of Crimean Tatars kids go to Crimean Tatars schools, the others to Russian ones.  
The preservation and revitalization of Crimean Tatar cultural heritage goes slower than it 
is demanded by the Crimean Tatars.407   
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d. The Crimean Tatar Socio-Economic Situation  
On August 11, 1995, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued a very 
ambitious Decree, “On Actions to Solve Political, Legal, Social-Economic and Ethnic 
Problems in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”408  However, it had a purely 
declarative character because it required financial resources that ware not attainable given 
Ukraine’s deteriorating economy.409  “Economically,” as one scholar has declared: 
Crimean Tatars are in a destitute situation even in relations to Crimea's 
depressed economy. Upward of an estimated 60% Crimean Tatars are 
unemployed (at least double the rate for Crimea as a whole), and around 
50% lack proper housing. Out of 291 Crimean Tatar settlements, around 
25% do not have electricity, 70% are without water, 90% without tarmac 
roads, 96% are without gas, and none have sewers. Since 1991, Ukraine 
has spent some US$300 million on Crimean Tatar repatriation programs 
— a significant sum for economically-depressed state…Since the USSR 
fell apart, Ukraine has been the only CIS country to bear the costs of 
Crimean Tatar resettlement, although the 1992 CIS agreement "On 
Questions of the Restoration of Rights of Deported Individuals, National 
Minorities, and Peoples," signed by the heads of 10 CIS states on 9 
October 1992 in Bishkek, provided for the participant countries to share 
the cost of Crimean Tatar return to Crimea. As economic crisis deepened 
in Ukraine, funding for the Crimean Tatar programs had to be drastically 
reduced: if in 1992 $95.2 million were provided, in 1994 — $59.6 million, 
and in 1997 - only $6.9 million. In 1999, out of $4.8 million budgeted; 
some $3.2 million were actually disbursed…410 
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It is estimated that $3 billion are necessary to resolve the Crimean Tatar 
problems.411  The international community is concerned about the low level of 
conveniences available to the Crimean Tatars.  It is explained by the fact that Tatars who 
returned from exile often grabbed their land illegally, and that such settlements were 
located far from the communication lines, sewer, water, electricity, etc.  
However, in any event, the Ukrainian Government is not capable of 
solving the problems of those returned from exile without considerable external 
assistance. “The existence of poverty and destitution was officially admitted in Ukraine 
only in 2000; at that time, 27.8 percent of the population (13.7 million persons) was 
considered to belong to the category of the impoverished, and 14.2 percent (almost 7 
million persons), to the category of the destitute…  At present [2000] in Ukraine there are 
more than one million families in which the per capita income does not reach fifty 
Ukrainian hrivnas (US$9) a month, while in more than one hundred thousand families it 
does not exceed twenty grivnas (US$3.60).”412  Poor housing and life standards are a 
dominant problem in Ukraine, not only for the Crimean Tatars.  According to the State 
Committee for Statistics, in 2006 only 56.4 percent of Ukrainian houses were equipped 
with running water, 54.0 percent with sewer, 82.8 percent with natural gas and 56.8 
percent with central heating.413  Thus, the poor situation of the Crimean Tatar housing is 
not a matter of discrimination by the Ukrainian or Crimean governments — it caused by 
systemic problems pertinent to Ukraine as a state. 
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e. Legislative Activities toward the Crimean Tatars: Conflicting 
Views and Facts 
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, President Yushchenko forced 
Crimean authorities to prepare a draft law “On Restoration of Rights for Those, Deported 
for Ethnic Reasons.”  Further action has been delayed, however, because of concern that 
the draft law contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine by granting certain nationalities 
exceptional rights at the expense of other nationalities.  The vice speaker of the Crimean 
Assembly, Mikhail Bakharev, also noted that the draft law does not have mandatory 
financial calculations for the cost of its fulfillment should it be adopted.  Overall, he 
thinks that the Crimean Tatars are already well-integrated into society, and that the state 
provides them more benefits than to any other ethnic group.414   
In 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a new program 
allocating US$129M as relief for those returning from former places of exile.415  The 
same document reports that out of 258 thousand returnees, 150 thousand already have 
living premises, six thousand families are waiting for living premises and seventeen 
thousand live in incomplete buildings.  Chubarov confirmed that, saying that those 
incomplete buildings have just 2-3 bedrooms.416  Such statistics need to be seen through 
comparative lenses.  In the interview, the Director of Foreign Intelligence Service of 
Ukraine (FISU), Mykola Malomuzh, delivered statistics that out of 4,350 FISU’s 
personnel,417 eight hundred (more than 18 percent) are not supplied with living premises 
by the state.  In Ukrainian military the situation is much worse.  Out of one hundred fifty-
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two thousand418 active duty personnel, 51,800 (more than 26 percent) are not supplied 
with the living premises, twenty thousand have been waiting for them for more than ten 
years, and twelve thousand retired without ever being supplied living quarters.419  Forty-
two thousand families who moved from contaminated areas after the nuclear disaster in 
Chernobyl in 1986 are still waiting for housing from the state.420  Official governmental 
statistics in Ukraine says that, in 2006, 1.3 million families in Ukraine were waiting for 
governmental housing, compared to only twenty thousand families who actually received 
it that same year.421  The statistics confirm that the constitutional principle of equality of 
the citizens of Ukraine in their rights is already violated by distinguishing the Crimean 
Tatars from the other citizens of Ukraine whose needs are as great as theirs. The Speaker 
of Crimean Assembly, Grytsenko, thinks that the governmental program of 2006-2010 
should be the last to be done in favor of the resettled ethnicities.422   
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CRIMEA 
Crimea, due to its volatile political and ethnic situation, has attracted much 
attention from international organizations.  The main players are the UN and 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  During the period from 
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1991 to 2000, international governmental and non-governmental organizations allocated 
US$10 million, comparing to US$300 million allocated by Ukraine.423   
OSCE became active in Ukraine in the end of 1994, opening offices in Kiev and 
Simferopol and jumping into the crisis situation in Crimea.  OCSE involvement is not 
always politically astute, as evidenced by a speech in 1995 by the head of OCSE mission 
in Ukraine, Andreas Kuhlschutter, who expressed support for secessionist attitudes in 
Crimea.424  Since 1992, the newly established OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM) has sought to facilitate negotiations, consensus building and 
negotiations on “institutional mechanisms for the accommodation of diversity.”425   
The UN’s Crimean Integration and Development Program (UNCIDP) proposed a 
$15 million plan in 1994 to alleviate the worst conditions in Crimean Tatar settlements 
and foster ethnic tolerance. As of 2000, the project was able to generate “US$3-4 million 
in pledges” from foreign governments.426  The shortage of enthusiasm is explained, 
oddly enough, by the lack of violence in the region.427  At about the same time, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) initiated PACE 
Recommendation No. 1455, which called for international support for the Crimean Tatars 
from the EU and other donors, and urged Ukraine and Crimean authorities to restore the 
Crimean Tatars right for education and public recognition of the Crimean Tatar 
language.428  Turkey, through the Turkish International Cooperation Agency, has 
officially promised to build one thousand homes for the Crimean Tatars — the project is 
not complete yet, owing to economic and political difficulties in Turkey itself.429  
Overall, the efforts of the international community have been directed at conflict 
prevention in an environment in which open conflict is largely absent.  As a consequence 
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its ambitious plans have failed due to lack of financial resources and political enthusiasm.  
“Since the USSR fell apart, Ukraine has been the only CIS country to bear the costs of 
Crimean Tatar resettlement [US$300 million comparing to US$10 million worth 
international assistance], although the 1992 CIS agreement “On Questions of the 
Restoration of Rights of Deported Individuals, National Minorities, and People,” signed 
by the heads of ten CIS states on October 9, 1992 in Bishkek provided for the participant 
countries to share the cost of Crimean Tatar return to Crimea.”430 
C. CONCLUSION 
Recently the Kosovo Parliament voted for independence from Serbia, a precedent 
likely to resonate among secessionists all over the world.  In many ways the situation in 
Crimea resembles the one in Kosovo.  The central government has allocated additional 
resources for the new citizens of Ukraine, those returned from exile, at the expense of 
other citizens whose prospects may be equally bleak. In Yugoslavia, the central 
government experienced difficulties with the Albanian nationalists in Kosovo.  Tito, the 
former Yugoslav president, provided “increased autonomy and greater economic 
assistance to Kosovo Albanians… [trying to make them] loyal citizens of Yugoslavia.”431  
As the result, Kosovo was subsidized by Yugoslavia.  The result is widely known: claims 
for full independence, atrocities on the both sides, and finally independence following 
international intervention spurred by large-scale violence.   
In Ukraine, certain political forces are trying to please the returnees at the expense 
of the other ethnic groups.  This political short-sightedness might lead to a deeper divide 
within the Crimean society and to political violence on behalf of the Crimean Tatar 
statehood. Independence of Kosovo, if ultimately achieved, creates a precedent that may 
lead to new conflicts, especially among so-called nations without states.432  
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The most workable solution for the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic minorities in 
the region is to be granted a non-territorial personal autonomy by Ukraine.  The radical 
draft laws proposed both by the current Ukrainian government and the Crimean Tatar 
members of Ukrainian Parliament are not the remedy for ethnic problems.  They solve 
one problem and create a multiplicity of others due to the abundance of nations and 
nationalities in Crimea.   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has tried to explain the ‘triangle of conflict,’ Russia–Crimea–Ukraine, 
in contemporary Crimea through the prism of earlier events, and to predict the array of 
possible developments that may follow from the current situation.  It studied history of 
the all the parties involved — Ukraine, Russia and the Crimean Tatars — in the Crimean 
peninsula as a scene of disputes.   
In the Ukrainian view, the Crimean peninsula is geographically an extension of 
Ukrainian steppe land, which has been linked, culturally and ethnically, to what is now 
Ukraine since before the emergence of the Kievan Rus’.  
In the Russian view, on the other hand, Crimea fell under Russian influence 
before the Mongol invasion, which means the Tatars are the real foreigners in Crimea.  
The history of Russian glory in Crimea started by Catherine the Great and was 
exemplified by the building of Sevastopol, an achievement celebrated in Russian history 
to this day, and solidified by the fact that the city remains the home port of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet.  The division of the Soviet BSF between Russia and Ukraine was long 
and painful, and the two states confronted each other on this matter angrily.  In 1997, 
Russia and Ukraine signed a bilateral treaty on friendship and, finally, divided up the 
BSF and arranged the basing rights issue in a way that has reduced, though perhaps not 
entirely eliminated, the possibility of serious conflict in the future. 
In the Crimean Tatar view, the Crimean peninsula is their only homeland, as 
established by a long history of state building there between the fifteenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  They consider themselves to be the indigenous people of the peninsula, whose 
statehood was destroyed by the Russian Empire.  Since the eighteenth century their 
nation has suffered progressively destructive discrimination, culminating in surgun, the 
complete exile from Crimea by Stalin in 1944.  More than four decades of political 
struggle with Soviet authorities allowed them to get certain benefits, eventually including 
a right to return to Crimea, achieved slightly before the collapse of the USSR itself.  
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Upon arrival, the exiled Crimean Tatars claimed Crimea as their homeland, adopting the 
“Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People” during the second 
Kurultai in 1991.   
The Crimean Tatar claims for national sovereignty are the most contested.  Their 
written historiography started in late nineteenth century.  Since the annexation of Crimea, 
the Crimean Tatars were not well suited to the modernization which was undertaken by 
Russia in Crimea.  Many opted to leave, mostly for Turkey, their religious patron.  Earlier, 
the conversion to Islam was the decisive point in the formation of the Crimean Tatars as a 
nation.  Before that time, history remembers Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans, Armenians and 
Jews, but not the Crimean Tatars.  At the same time, it must be admitted that the Crimean 
Tatars roots run deeper in Crimea than those of the Russians and Ukrainians.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought political entrepreneurship into action in 
Crimea.  Historical myths contributed to political mobilization of the ethnic groups involved 
in disputes.  The regional political leadership was weak and lacked political experience in 
dealing with ethnic issues.  Initially, Crimea’s Russian majority contributed to attempts to 
establish Crimean autonomy within the Soviet Union.  Later, Ukrainian independence and 
subsequent democratization contributed to the emergence of a multiplicity of mutually 
competitive political parties and movements.  
Russian separatism culminated in 1994 in an attempt to secede to Russia.  The 
attempt collapsed, owing in part to weak support from Russia itself, which preferred to use 
the occasion to extend its influence indirectly over one of its most important neighbors. This 
judgment has been largely vindicated by subsequent events.  The assumption that the 
Crimean population wanted to remain in Ukraine is supported by its participation in multiple 
national elections and referenda. 
Credit should be given to Ukraine for the ability to solve secessionist attempts 
peacefully and to withstand pressure from Russia over the BSF.  The bilateral Treaty with 
Russia on Friendship and Cooperation signed in May 1997 and the Black Sea Fleet 
Accords undermined, but did not fully eliminate, grounds for Russian separatism in  
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Crimea. Russian nationalism in Crimea still exists, and is fueled by certain political circles 
from Russia; but it appears to have lost the opportunity to win local support, at least given 
the current level of interethnic tension in Crimea. 
Currently, the situation in the ‘triangle of conflict’ is different from the 1990s.  
The Crimean Tatar national movement, spurred by the arrival of former exiles eager to 
redress both real and mythical injustices, represents a far greater risk to the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine than pro-Russian separatism did.  The Crimean Tatar claims evolved 
from the right to return to their historic homeland to recognition as the indigenous peoples in 
Crimea, a claim that has provided them with considerable benefits.  As early as 1991 they 
declared the national sovereignty of Crimean Tatar peoples.  There is little doubt that the 
final goal of the Crimean Tatars is to achieve territorial autonomy and, later, national 
sovereignty. The Crimean Tatar leadership continues to demand new legislation elevating 
them over the other citizens of Ukraine.  Their claims are reinforced by the newly adopted 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the precedent of unilateral 
proclamation of independence by Kosovo. 
These attempts are destabilizing for Crimea.  It is early to predict an emergence of 
an independent Crimean Tatar state, given their still-modest share of the Crimean 
population.  Yet, some tendencies have a negative character for Ukraine.  First, the rate of 
growth of the population is advantageous for the Crimean Tatars, whose birth rate is higher 
than that of neighboring populations.  Such a factor does not imply a rapid shift in the 
Crimean demographics, but a saying that ‘some wars can be won in a bed’ seems to be right 
for Crimea, given sufficient time.  Second, public attitude can be shaped to favor the 
Crimean Tatars, many of whom experienced considerable hardship, caused first by forced 
resettlement and then by the weak economic performance of the Ukrainian state, which has 
few resources with which to right the old wrongs.  This allows for manipulating public 
opinion and mobilizing the poorest Tatars for violent action, perhaps under the sway Islamic 
radicals who have found a sympathetic reception in Crimea.  Young Crimean Tatars without 
prospects are the perfect target for radical Islamist recruiters.  
Russia is still interested in Crimea, especially following the Orange Revolution and 
general degradation of Russo-Ukrainian Relations.  Unresolved issues — on Russia-Ukraine 
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borders in the Strait of Kerch and the Sea of Azov, navigational facilities occupied by the 
RBSF in addition to the Accords of 1997, Ukraine’s attempts to revise the RBSF basing 
rights — have inspired Russian authorities to invent new roles and missions for the RBSF in 
Ukraine, above all as a deterrent against possible Crimean Tatar claims for independence.  
The studies in the Chapter V proved very low, or ever wrong, for the likelihood of the RBSF 
to deter the Crimean Tatar claim for independence. 
The central government in Kiev has played a very careful game with Crimea, based 
on balancing pro-Russian and Crimean Tatar political forces, and allowing neither side to tip 
the scales for the own advantage.  In 1996, the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted 
elaborating the peculiarities of Crimean autonomy in the unitary Ukrainian state.  In 1998, 
the fourth (and still current) Constitution of the ARC was approved by the Parliament in 
Kiev, with full recognition of Crimea as the part of Ukraine.  Arrangements with respect to 
Tatar autonomy are vague, however, and do not provide lot of room for self-determination.  
This is because the constitution was arranged with a view of appeasing ethnic Russians, not 
the Crimean Tatars. To that extent, it is destined to become increasingly obsolete. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The solution for the integration of the Crimean Tatars and other minorities issue 
in Crimea has political, cultural, socioeconomic, humanitarian and legal dimensions.  On 
the political level, the Ukrainian government needs to more fully identify the place of the 
Crimean Tatars and other previously deported minorities in society, and their political 
role in the government.  The Crimean Tatars achieved their primary goal when they were 
finally able to return to their homeland.  Since than, its leadership has not yet built up a 
program for the development of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group.  Besides bare 
words in the Declaration for the self-determination, no systemic program has been 
offered by the Crimean Tatar leadership, a major source of dissention and factionalism.  
The Crimean Tatars experience internal divisions such that Mejelis and Kurultai no 
longer represent them convincingly.  Crimean authorities, along with the central 
government in Kiev, need to develop a detailed roadmap for the integration of the 
previously deported peoples in Ukrainian society, taking into account non-compact 
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settlement of the Crimean Tatars.  The demographic situation in Crimea and the small 
share of the Crimean Tatars in the peninsula do not allow the Crimean Tatars territorial 
autonomy.  Separate draft laws granting special rights to the Crimean Tatars or other 
‘preferred’ categories can further destabilize Crimea.  Instead, a realistic quota of 
parliamentary seats needs to be established for the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic 
groups, according to their demographic share.  The smallest groups can get representation 
by cumulative share based upon intergroup arrangements.  Consequently, the term of 
service for the elected Members of the ARC Parliament needs to be reduced from four to 
two years, with the goal of guaranteeing timely rotations for the representatives of the 
smallest ethnic groups.   
The government of Ukraine needs to insist that the BSF Accords about the 
withdrawal of the RBSF from Ukraine in 2017 be enforced.  The basing cost needs to be 
established on the current market basis.  However, careful study of the Accords is 
necessary to identify the legal possibility for achieving that.  It can be done by 
establishing bilateral commission with participation of independent (international) 
experts in the fields of international law and real estate.  
The remedy for the deteriorating situation in the socioeconomic sphere of life is 
simple, universal and well known.  The government needs to distance itself from the 
overregulation of the economy both in Ukraine and Crimea.  It is clear that the current 
system is corrupt, slow and destructive.  Artificially regulated markets inhibit foreign and 
domestic investment.  Enlargement of the job market is perhaps the single most 
promising means of pacifying the socioeconomic grievances of the Crimean population. 
In the humanitarian sphere, both the central and Crimean governments need to 
encourage the arrival of NGOs to Crimea to promote ethnic tolerance on the grass-roots 
level to foster the practice of peaceful co-existence among the peoples of different 
cultures and religions.  In the cultural sphere, the governments should encourage cultural 
exchanges and arrange weeks of ethic cultures of various Crimean peoples. 
Even without any program for the development of previously deported peoples, 
there are several steps to be taken in the legal field.  First, the Constitutional Court of 
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Ukraine should define the meaning of a term ‘indigenous people,’ mentioned in Article 
11, 92, 119 of the Constitution of Ukraine, as distinct from the term ‘national minorities.’  
This is important for dealing with ethnic issues in Ukraine’s multiethnic society, and in 
the wake of the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the 
UN General Assembly in 2007.  Second, the Constitution of the ARC needs to be 
amended to grant the Crimean Tatar language the same status as the Russian language in 
Crimea.  Despite the fact that the Crimean Tatar language is used by the Crimean Tatars 
to a lesser extent than Russian (many started to lose it after the deportation), the provision 
limiting its utilization in Crimean courts needs to be lifted.  Third, the law “On the 
Citizenship of Ukraine” needs to be amended to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship 
for the deported peoples, who were on Ukrainian territory on the day of its amendment.  
The law should contain the possibility for limited family reunion in the case of divided 
families.  It will help prevent the legal movement of Islamic extremists to Ukraine, and 
facilitate a resolution of existing problems for the previously deported peoples who are in 
Ukraine already.  Finally, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine needs to 
control the enforcement of the already adopted law to punish illegal land seizures, to 
prevent land speculations and to facilitate land distribution for those in need. 
The list is not a dogma.  However, the biggest mistake would be to give 
preference to certain categories of people on the basis of their past experiences.  Conflict 
prevention policy must accommodate the grievances of the society as a whole, not just of 
a part of it.  Otherwise, it will resemble the medieval practice of curing pain by inflicting 
pain in other parts of body, forcing individuals to switch attention from one type of pain 
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